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Abstract

Three Essays on Institutions, Religion and Economic Development

Hossein Radmard

This dissertation consists of three essays that provide empirical evidence on the importance of
institutions, informal institutions and particularly religion in economic development. In the first
chapter, the relationship between religious adherence rate in the U.S. counties and
entrepreneurship is examined. After controlling for spatial dependencies, results indicate that
more religious counties, meaning counties with higher rate of religious membership, have lower
entrepreneurial potentials. Chapter 2 investigates the relevance of institutional quality in
efficiency of public spending. This study is delivered in the state level. By using a nonparametric method, efficiency of public spending is calculated and then its relationship with
some indicators of institutional quality is tested. It is shown that states with better judicial system
and less restrictive labor market present more effective public spending. In the last chapter the
role of state religiosity in the political and societal conflict is studied. The hypothesis states that
if a country has a religious government, the chance and magnitude of having a domestic conflict
due to religious heterogeneity would increase. After controlling for several covariates, there is
not enough evidence found to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore religious heterogeneity in
countries with religious state seems to be associated with larger magnitude of conflict.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In studies on economic development, a large literature has been accumulated on the topic of
institutions in recent decades. Douglass North gives a general definition for institutions as ―rules
of the game‖ that shape human interactions. They are humanly devised constraints that affect
interactions between people. Changing these constraints affects people‘s incentives and,
therefore, affects economic, political, and social outcomes. Studying institutional arrangements
helps to shed some light on why there is a high variation of the level of economic development
across economies. There is a growing number of studies focusing on this particular aspect of
institutions. Some of them conclude that institutions are among the most important factors
explaining the differences in economic performance, e.g. Acemoglu, Johsnon and Robisnon
(2001). But some claim that institutions are more of the outcome of policies, and some other
factors such as human capital have more priority in the analysis, e.g. Glaeser, La Porta and
Shleifer (2004). Overall based on this literature, we can confidently state that institutions matter
in many different aspects of development.
The ultimate purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to the empirical evidence on the
importance of institutions in development and to shed light on particular channels through which
this connection improves. To this end, in two chapters I specifically concentrate on one informal
institution, religion, and in the other essay I examine the relationship between institutional
quality and government performance in local level.
Studying informal institutions, such as culture, social norms and religion have been
attracting attention in sociology, political science and recently in economics. Religion, taken as
one important variable in socio-economic performance, is related to economic development
1

through very diverse channels. In the two chapters of this dissertation, I try to contribute to areas
of entrepreneurship and political stability and their connection to religion. Another area of
studies in this dissertation is the relationship between quality of institutions and efficiency of
governments. In what follows, I introduce the three essays and briefly present their main findings
and contributions.

1.1
Religion and Entrepreneurship: A County-level Analysis
There is a growing consensus that religion plays an important role in various social and
economic outcomes, yet little is known about specific mechanisms and channels through which
religion affects economic development. Theoretical studies on this topic can be dated back to
Max Weber‘s seminal work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. More recent
studies, particularly empirical ones, focus on growth and social outcomes (e.g. Barro and
McCleary, 2003). One key component of development, left out from the literature of economics
of religion, is entrepreneurship. It is believed by many scholars that entrepreneurship and what
entrepreneurs do is essential for dynamic and sustainable economic growth and development.
This essay examines whether level of entrepreneurship across the U.S. counties can be
explained by religiosity and religious diversity. The underlying goal is to investigate if faith and
religious practice of individuals impact their entrepreneurial behavior. Very few studies look into
this particular channel through which religion and economic performance can be connected.
Dodd and Gotsis (2007) examine a similar question using some micro-level survey-based
dataset. But in this paper, I try to consider the aggregated county-level data and focus more on
the collective entrepreneurial potential of people in communities rather than individual level.
Entrepreneurship can be viewed from completely different perspectives. In this chapter,
two different variables are constructed to proxy what can partially capture entrepreneurial
2

potential in county level. It is stated ―partially‖, because coming up with one single measure
showing the entrepreneurship of a society or a locality is quite an impossible task to accomplish.
That is why the two measures are considered to tackle different aspects of the dependent
variable. They are the share of self-employment in the total employment, and the annual growth
rate of small firms in each county.
Religious adherence rates for each county are used as a measure of religiosity level, and
religious diversity is calculated considering five main religious denominations: Catholics,
Evangelical Protestant, Mainline Protestant, Orthodox and the others. These variables are taken
and constructed from Religious Congregations and Membership Studies.1
After considering spatial dependencies among counties, by employing spatial
econometric methods, results indicate that religious factors are not beneficial for
entrepreneurship within the borders of a county. But they positively affect neighboring localities‘
entrepreneurial potential. Also there is a small variation of effects among different
denominations. This paper contributes to the literature of economics of religion in two ways.
First, relationship between religion and entrepreneurship has not been investigated for this level
of study in previous research. Second, including spatial modeling in this literature can help
understand the mechanism by which religion can impact behavior and eventually economic
output. This aspect has been neglected from previous studies as well.
1.2
Institutional Quality and Efficiency of Public Spending: Evidence from the U.S.
State Governments
It is often perceived by many government officials that higher GDP per capita and more income
equality are favorable for the economy. Scholars from different school of thoughts also assume
balanced policies toward growth and equality would result in more stable development process.

1

It is organized and conducted by Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA).
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To reach these two goals, different policies can be implemented. Fiscal tools, such as public
spending may have a significant effect on economic growth and income distribution. There is
important evidence in the real world, and that is the remarkable variation across economies in the
effectiveness of their public expenditure. The second chapter of the dissertation focuses on this
aspect of public spending and its relationship with institutions. Particularly the impact of some
institutional quality measures on effectiveness of public spending for governments of the 50
states in the U.S is examined.
Basically the question is if better institutions would promote higher efficiency of public
spending. The efficiency particularly is measured regarding how much growth and equality
simultaneously can be achieved given a certain level of public spending. For this purpose a
nonparametric method, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), is employed to calculate the
efficiency.
There are three major venues for comparing institutional quality which are considered:
judicial system, labor market and political affiliation. In these areas, there is not a large variation
among states in the U.S (as compared to cross country comparisons). Nonetheless we still can
observe the differences in performance of judiciaries and also structure of labor markets.
Moreover political preferences are varied among states. On the other side we see variation
among states‘ public spending efficiencies. Arizona and Idaho seem to have the most efficient
public spending while Alaska and Wyoming are among the least efficient ones. The ultimate
goal here would be to investigate if these variations in effectiveness can be explained by level
institutional qualities. The overall findings confirm that better judicial system and less regulation
in the labor market enhance effectiveness of state governments.

4

1.3
Religious Heterogeneity, State Religiosity and Conflict
Secularization theory prior to the 1980‘s was the dominant paradigm among social scientists
(Nordas, 2004). This theory claims as societies become industrialized and generally modernized,
political power of religion would fade away. However there are multiple real world examples
that challenge and negate this theory as there have been states with religion at the core of their
constitution and political existence. Gill and Keshavarzian (1999) show that old line
secularization theory is not supported by empirical evidence. Religious organizations and leaders
have become more politically active and in some cases they have been able to have direct impact
on the policy decision making levels in the government. Therefore religion is one important topic
when we study the social and political status of countries.
Besides this issue, observation from around the world reveals that in most of the
countries, population demographics have become more diverse. This can be due to several
reasons including immigration. Along with this increasing social heterogeneity, religious
fractionalization would increase as well. Social heterogeneity for so many years has been one
issue studied by social scientists as one factor relevant to challenges of societal and political
stability. Basically there are studies that claim as societies become more diverse, e.g. higher
religious diversity; the probability of political instability due to confrontation of different groups
would increase. One typical representation of social/political instability is violent conflict, e.g.
civil war.
In this chapter, I want to connect these two topics and examine two hypotheses regarding
the relationship between religion and conflict. The first hypothesis presents the question of
whether countries with higher religious heterogeneity face higher risk and magnitude of conflict.
The idea of social heterogeneity, i.e. ethno-lingual or cultural diversity, has been studied
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extensively in the conflict literature. However there are a limited number of studies focusing on
religious heterogeneity.
The second hypothesis, which is the main contribution to the literature, includes the role
of the state. It investigates whether having a religious government affects the relationship
between heterogeneity of society and its propensity to have political violent conflict. Measuring
the religiosity of the state is a challenge. I rely on the constitutional framework of countries and
also the regulations toward religious groups and activities. Data from the Religion and State
project (RAS) is extensively used here.
After offering two different ways of measuring religious heterogeneity and state
religiosity, by controlling for some key covariates, results confirm that the religiosity of state in
heterogeneous societies can be a catalyst for conflict. It means that in countries with religious
states, higher religious heterogeneity is associated with higher magnitude of conflict.

6

Chapter 2
Religion and Entrepreneurship: A County-level Analysis
2.1
Introduction
The teachings of most of religions have general or detailed rules and frameworks for different
aspects of the adherents‘ lives, including the economic aspect. In the religious texts of different
faiths there are several sets of rules that regulate ―right‖ and ―wrong‖ behavior. Besides
teachings and rules, religion as an informal institution in any society, directly or indirectly affect
economic output through various social channels. For example creation of networks around
religious groups impacts members‘ behavior. If an individual is a member of a religious group
and therefore a part of a network, information and resources availability for them would be
different. So in the aggregate level this one particular dimension of religion will affect behaviors
and in general changes the rule of game.
This paper investigates the relationship between religious factors and one dimension of
economic behavior of individuals. Particularly entrepreneurial behavior is the matter of concern
here. Putting in short form, I want to test if religiosity and religious diversity have any effect on
the level of entrepreneurship. The analysis is for the counties in the U.S.
There is only a small number of studies that investigates a similar question. But they are
all in a different scale or implementing different variables. Anderson et al. (2000) explores the
role of religion in the formation of enterprise culture in Britain during the 1980s. Their finding
shows that despite the confrontation of the Church and economic conventional view back in
1980s, religion supported the entrepreneurial culture. Dodd and Gotsis (2007) look into the same
relationship using survey data in the U.S. Audretsch et al. (2007) examines the influence of
different religions on propensity to become an entrepreneur in India. Using individual level
7

survey data, they find Christians and Muslims tend to present higher propensity to become
entrepreneur, as opposed to Buddhists and Hindus. Carswell and Rolland (2007) approach a
similar question as the current paper and use survey data in New Zealand. They show that the
increase in the religiosity and religious diversity of New Zealand society has not affected
entrepreneurship negatively.
The study of religion in the realm of social sciences, particularly modern economics, is
relatively a new phenomenon. However some claim Weber‘s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit
of Capitalism, written in 1905, was the first to identify economic role of faith. Iannaccone (1998)
even argues that Adam Smith was the one who started the modern study of economics of
religion. Anderson (1988) investigates the aspects of Wealth of Nations in which the economics
of religion is highlighted. In any case, the importance of religion as an informal institution in
different parts of social lives of individuals has been attracting attention of economists for a
while. This increase in research examining the economic functions of religion was accompanied
by a new trend in quantitative studies. These studies started to grow rapidly after a paper titled
―Religion and Economic Growth‖ by Barro and McCleary in 2003. The authors analyze the
influence of religious participation and beliefs on a country‘s rate of economic growth. They find
that some aspects of beliefs, i.e. belief in heaven and hell, are positively associated with
economic growth while religious service attendance negatively impacts the growth.
The current paper is trying to seek out a slightly different part of religiosity‘s importance.
Entrepreneurship is increasingly being recognized as a primary engine of economic growth and
development. What entrepreneurs do is crucial to the dynamics of any society by which they
combine the existing resources and innovative ideas to create new economic goods and services
and ultimately new jobs. In short, entrepreneurs are the link between the new ideas and economic
growth and development. Do the faith and religious practice of people affect their entrepreneurial
8

behavior? Is there any connection between the level of religiosity and the entrepreneurial
activities? Logically at the beginning we need to define these two concepts, entrepreneurship and
religiosity. Secondly, this question can be answered or analyzed at different layers. For example
at one level, the story can be the relationship between religious values of an individual and his
creative and innovative character. So it would be an absolute micro level analysis that can be
very well categorized in other field of social or human sciences. On another level, we can look at
these questions, in an aggregated level of a group of individuals. Here, rather than micro
analysis, I am interested in examining the topic at the social level. In other words, I want to
examine if the importance of religion in a society has any effect on entrepreneurial behavior of
members of that society and ultimately the level of entrepreneurship.
Besides the ultimate objective of this paper which is to investigate the relationship
between religious factors and entrepreneurship, the spatial behaviors of these variables are
examined as well. By that, I am referring to the impact of entrepreneurship and religious factors
in one county on entrepreneurship level of the neighboring counties. For measuring religiosity,
like some previous studies, data from the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA) is
utilized. This is from Religious Congregations and Membership Study in year 2000. 2
The contributions of this paper can be summarized in different parts. First, the research
question of this paper for the scale of counties in the U.S has not been investigated before. So it
is a new dimension to be added to the literature of economics of religion in the scale of regional
studies. Second, the argument of spatial dependence and spatial behavior, to the knowledge of
author is a new approach in the literature of both entrepreneurship and economics of religion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will be a literature review.
Section 3 consists of a theoretical argument and states the hypotheses of the paper. Section 4
2

The data is collected by Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies and is available on the
Association of Religion Data Archives website: www.TheARDA.com.
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describes the data and the variables. Model and specification are presented in section 5 followed
by empirical results and finally the conclusion.
2.2
Literature Review
The consensus of the studies in the literature of economics of religion is; it is likely that religion
affects economic performance and this impact happens through different yet highly related
channels. One channel is the essence of religious teaching and principles.
Anderson (1988) refers to Adam Smith‘s Theory of Moral Sentiments and points out that
religious belief provides strong incentives to follow moral restraints such as trust, honesty,
benevolence, and restraint from violence that have an effect on civil society. Iannaccone (1995)
points out that all religions work to instill certain values, morals, and behavioral frameworks in
their followers and these values, beliefs, and morals are recognized in most aspects of human
behavior. Another similar argument is that the belief or the fear of God leads adherents to abide
by ―a kind of internal moral enforcement mechanism‖ (Anderson, 1988, p. 1069). This is what
sometime is referred to as ―supernatural monitoring‖ or ―God is watching you‖, which leads
adherents to be trustworthy, truthful, honest, and ethical (Innacconne, 1995; Anderson and
Tollison, 1992). Berggren (1997) claims religious people are discouraged from engaging in
activities such as divorce, abortion, non-payment of debt, and illegitimate births, treating these
activities as sinful. All of these indirectly point to the effects that belief in the religions‘
principles would have on the behavior and ultimately on the economic activity and performance.
A similar literature has documented the importance of religion on economic and social outcomes
in the US. Lipford et al. (1993) study the impact of church membership (using US state level
data) on abortion, divorce, murder, illegitimate births and crime and find that church attendance
has a negative effect on most of these variables.
Another part of the literature emphasizes the idea of social interaction and social
networks. Membership in a religious group would lead to the formation of a network. This
10

network can be the source of accumulation of what is called ―social capital‖. There are studies
that show higher religious adherence also leads to higher social capital in a community or
locality. Putnam (1993) argues that trust, and therefore social capital, is higher in societies that
have dense networks of civic engagement. These networks include neighborhood associations,
sports clubs, choral societies, and political parties. Religious institutions and religious service
attendance are often cited as sources of social capital as well (Putnam, 2000; Smidt, 1999;
Greeley, 1997; Wuthnow, 1997; Tolbert et al., 1998). This form of capital has been viewed as a
vehicle for improving individuals‘ well-being and for discouraging free riding and shirking.
Several papers examine the effect of religion on human capital and income (Fan, 2008; Sander,
2002; Steen, 1996; Tomes, 1984). [See Appendix for the summary of their results]
An alternative analysis to the above is that religious adherence or participation requires
additional resources (e.g. time) (Barro and McCleary, 2003) and this leads to a negative
relationship between religious activities and economic growth. Some other studies put this in the
form of opportunity cost of time in the individual level decision making indicating that higher
rate of attendance increases the opportunity cost (Azzi and Ehrenberg, 1975; Lipford and
Tollison, 2003).
Heath et al. (1995) study the effects of religion on the level of income using the U.S. state
level data. More importantly, they analyze the effects of various denominations categorized as
Jewish, Catholic, liberal and fundamentalist Protestant and find that Jewish membership is
positively associated with state per capita income, liberal Protestantism is not associated with
state per capita income and Catholicism and fundamentalist Protestantism are inversely
associated with state per capita income. Crain and Lee (1999) examine the relation between
church membership and per capita income growth in state-level in the U.S. and find no evidence
of significant effect.

11

Religious diversity or polarization has also received attention in this literature
(Montalvoa and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Barro and McCleary, 2003; Lipford and Tollison, 2003).
The original argument dating back to Adam Smith is that established (one state-funded and
protected monopoly) churches tend not to be successful in enforcing the moral virtues of
followers (Hull and Bold, 1998). In other words, greater diversity of religion in a country or
region promotes higher competition resulting in higher quality religion (Barro and McCleary,
2003). Iannaccone (1998) cites empirical evidence to support Smith‘s claim that concentrated
religious markets result in lower levels of religious participation. An underlying point related to
present research is that a monopolized religious market may contribute to negative economic
growth. Hull and Bold (1998) argue that empirical findings to support Smith‘s claim may not be
applicable to the US since competition between established and non-established churches is not
comparable to competition among non-established churches, even if concentration is high in a
market of non-established churches. A related argument is that religious fractionalization, similar
to ethnic fractionalization, has a negative effect on economic development. From a social capital
perspective, religiously fragmented societies have less social capital, leading to less-trusting
societies. An alternative point of view is that greater diversity in the form of a ―melting pot‖
(Florida, 2002) can enhance economic well-being in a society.
The other part of the related literature to the current research includes various studies
examining entrepreneurship. Since entrepreneurship is a multidimensional concept and there is
no general agreement on an economic theory of entrepreneurship, previous studies have defined
and used the term in different ways. Beginning with Schumpeter (1934) an ―entrepreneur‖ is an
individual with innovative ideas, utilizing new combinations of means of production. Kirzner
(1979) emphasized the entrepreneur as an enthusiast in discovering opportunities to make profit.
Knight (1921) and Schultz (1980) described an entrepreneur as an individual who is willing to
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take risks in performing economic functions, while others (Hagen, 1960; McClelland, 1965;
Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979) argued that an entrepreneur is a person with certain unique
psychological characteristics. Although these concepts have contributed greatly to the
understanding of entrepreneurship, a universally accepted explanation or measure of the concept
has not yet been found. Hence, previous studies have used different concepts according to the
purpose of the study, the theory applied, and the availability of information needed for empirical
research.
Acs et al. (2005) used start-ups of new firms as a measure of entrepreneurship that
facilitates spillover of knowledge. This is based on the theory of endogenous growth where
knowledge was added as a factor explaining economic growth aside from the traditional factors
of production, capital, and labor. Audretsch and Keilbach (2005) introduced the concept of
entrepreneurship capital, referring to the society‘s capacity to create entrepreneurial activity
specifically to generate new firms. They hypothesized that a region with more entrepreneurship
capital shows a better economic performance. This is based on the theory of entrepreneurship
serving as a mechanism to transform knowledge spillovers to economic growth.
A section in this literature that is highly related to the rationale of this paper is the role
and function of social networks in promoting entrepreneurship. Aldrich and Zimmer (1986)
introduced a model that identifies entrepreneurship as embodied in a network of continuing
social relations. This network facilitates or constrains the linkage between aspiring
entrepreneurs, resources and opportunities. This framework is different from the traditional
model which assumed entrepreneurship as a highly personality-based concept. Dubini and
Aldrich (1991) expand the arguments to different subsections of the network: organizational and
informal. They argue that there is a coexistence and coordination between the two networks in
order to promote and facilitate the entrepreneur‘s activities. Greve and Salaff (2003) study the
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network activities of entrepreneurs and claim that in different stages of starting a business,
entrepreneurs establish different networks. Overall the literature on entrepreneurship and
network effects has been expanding and the general conclusion supports the significant positive
effect of networking on expansion of entrepreneurial activities.
2.3
Theoretical Argument
The association between religion and the level of entrepreneurial activity can be looked into from
different angles. In this paper both religious factors and entrepreneurship are aggregated for the
county level analysis. Therefore although the theoretical reasoning behind the empirical study is
based on individual behavior analysis, the result should be discussed and adjusted in the
aggregate level.
As mentioned in previous sections, religions provide moral and ethical foundation for
their adherents encouraging them to behave in a specific way. Thereby economic behavior might
be directly influenced by the impact on traits and attitudes, and indirectly by promoting factors
which themselves influence economic outcomes (Barro, 2003). Also, religion may influence
economic results through its institutional sources. Public commitment to a religious organization,
like attending religious services, signals the acceptance of a certain code of conduct. This creates
incentives among possible transaction partners to use religion as a signal for specific
characteristics of a person (Tomes, 1984). Furthermore being a part of a network would impact
the intensity and level of economic behavior. In particular, when we are looking at the
entrepreneurial activity, the concept of social interaction and network effect would be more
important. Basically the hypothetical claim is that, people would be affected by being a religious
adherent or a member of a religious denomination, through two channels: first, based on the
teaching of the religion and second under the influence of the socio-religious network that they
are a part of.

Although both of the two venues of impact seem strong and relevant, yet
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expecting a particular sign or significance for the relationship between religiosity and
entrepreneurship is difficult.
The other religious factor that is included in the analysis is the religious fractionalization.
As discussed in the literature review section, social, cultural and religious diversity have impacts
on different economic parameters. Entrepreneurship level, if we can define it in the general form
as the density of innovative activities in one locality, can effect and be affected by religious
plurality. The idea is that as the society gets more diverse, it becomes a better platform for
different enterprise plans to grow. At the same time possibly we can claim that entrepreneurs
would be attracted to more diverse societies so they can start up their business with a hope of
having more chance to expand due to the diverse market they have. On the other hand, along
with the literature of fractionalization, religious diversity can negatively affect the economic
performance. The rationale behind this claim mainly originated from the idea of increasing
probability of conflict or instability due to ethno-lingual or religious fractionalization (Easterly
and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2006). This line of reasoning is
more valid when we are focusing on national level rather than the small community analysis.
Therefore, overall for the current paper it is expected to have a positive correlation between
religious diversity and entrepreneurship.
For the dependent variable, entrepreneurship, there are three main categories of theories:
personality theories, economic rationality theories and sociocultural theories. In personality
theory, the psychological and special personal traits are the main force that makes individuals
prone to behaving as entrepreneurs (Brockhaus, 1982). Economic rational theory considers
entrepreneurs as rational agents who scan the market and choose the niche that will help them to
maximize their return. Finally the sociocultural theories posit the propensity to entrepreneurship
based on nationality, race, culture and religion (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986). In reality
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entrepreneurship is a mixed result of all these ideas which are highly related to each other. In this
paper the two economic and sociocultural theories are more emphasized.
The general hypothesis is that, there is a significant relationship between religious factors
and entrepreneurship in counties of the U.S. In other words, religiosity and religious diversity are
significant explanatory variables for entrepreneurial potential. By the theoretical basis presented
here, I expect to see a positive effect of religious diversity on entrepreneurship; however sign of
religiosity coefficient seems unclear. Besides this part of hypothesis, the paper investigates the
spatial behavior of the main variables as well. Basically I propose two questions: does
entrepreneurship in one county have any impact on entrepreneurship in the neighboring
counties? Also, do religious factors in one county affect the entrepreneurship in neighbors?
Why should there be such spatial relation to begin with? The broad answer to this
question is, in analyzing social or economic variables in small scale, e.g. counties; spatial
dependence is an inevitable fact. Only in the labor section we can discuss that there are different
types of mobilities that make the analysis more complicated. There are residences of one county
who may go to a church which is located in the neighboring county or they may work in another
county. All these mobilities cause a realistic suspicion toward spatial dependence.
2.4
Variables and Data
Measuring entrepreneurship and religiosity is a critical task to accomplish as in the literature
there is no consensus on the approaches. This problem comes down to the single issue of how to
define each of the two concepts. In this section the definition and the variables employed in the
paper are described.
As explained in the theoretical section, entrepreneurship can be viewed from completely
different perspectives. Here in this paper, two different variables are constructed to proxy what
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can partially capture entrepreneurial potential at the county level. It is stated ―partially‖, because
coming up with one single measure showing the entrepreneurship of a society or a locality is
quite an impossible task to accomplish. That is why the two measures are considered to tackle
different aspects of the dependent concept (entrepreneurship).
Religiosity also, as the main religious factor included in the paper, is difficult to quantify.
There are different measured used in the literature as proxy for this variable. Usually the level of
attendance (to religious services) and general (religious) adherence rate are taken into
consideration.3 Attendance rates are constructed by the surveys that are delivered at the
individual level. In the following paragraphs, I explain the variables and the data sources used in
the paper.
2.4.1 Entrepreneurship (Enti): self-employment & small firms growth rate
The idea of using self-employment as a proxy for entrepreneurship has been challenged and
criticized in the literature but overall it can be claimed as one of the typical determinants (Parker,
2004). Low et al. (2005) define two measures of entrepreneurial potential. One is an indicator of
the ―breadth‖ of entrepreneurship and the other is a measure of its ―depth‖. Share of selfemployment (non-farm proprietors) from total non-farm employment is the variable for
capturing the breadth of entrepreneurial potential and the average income of non-farm
proprietors in the accounted county is the indicator of depth of entrepreneurship. The first
measure refers to the concentration of entrepreneurs and basically shows how rich a county is as
far as entrepreneurial activities. On the other hand, depth variable would account for the amount
of wealth that entrepreneurs generate and therefore could lead to continuous growth in the
number of entrepreneurs. In this paper, the first measure in Low et al. (2005), share of self-

3

―Belief in god‖, ―importance of religion in daily life‖ and similar variables are common as well in the literature.
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employment, is used as a proxy for entrepreneurship. The data of proprietors are from Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) over the time range of years 2000 to 2010.
In the literature small businesses are perceived as a vehicle for both Schumpeterian
entrepreneurs, those who introduce innovative production process, and also for those who are
simply self-employed (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999). This means small establishments and
firms provide an opportunity for innovative ideas to develop and grow. Also because of low cost
they are more suitable for starting self-employment businesses. In general due to the small scale
of cost and management, small businesses are better platform for growing entrepreneurial startups. Small businesses not only contribute to the employment level but also to innovative and
competitive power. The importance of small firms and their relationship to entrepreneurship is
not a new observation. Henderson (2006) implements ratio of small firms to the total number of
establishment as a proxy for entrepreneurial potential.
The second measure of entrepreneurship considered in the chapter is the average annual
growth rate of firms with less than 500 employees. There are different definitions for small
businesses depending on the structure of the firm, the support it receives from the public
agencies or the size of its employment. For the size of employment also there are different
categorizations. Here I considered less than 500 employees as small firm and using the data from
Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB) for year 2000 to 2009. I constructed the annual growth rate
of the number of these small firms in each county. This variable basically measures the change in
the number of active small firms. Counties present different trend in the combination of small
and large establishment and firms. In some localities the number of active small firms shows
high volatility as we observe different rate of birth and death of small businesses.
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The limitation of empirical studies on capturing entrepreneurship activities always exists.
I believe these two variables, as several studies in the literature (mentioned in the literature
review section) also use them, are good proxies for showing a large portion of entrepreneurial
potential of the counties. One point however worth mentioning is the difference in the statistical
nature of them. The first variable, percentage of self-employment, is a level variable but the other
variable is a growth rate. So in interpretation of the coefficients and marginal effects this
difference should be considered.
2.4.2 Religious Factors (RELi): Religiosity & Religious Diversity
In the quantitative research related to the topic of religion, measuring the religiosity level has
always been an issue. Different studies have been employing different proxies and using various
data sets available. Almost all of the cross country studies use the data from the World Value
Survey (WVS) and utilize some questions regarding the belief in life after the death or religious
denominations to measure the religiosity. Studies concentrated on the U.S. however mostly
employ the data available through the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA) or
General Social Survey (GSS). Here in this paper church membership and religious adherence
percentage from Religious Congregations and Membership Studies provided by ARDA are the
main explanatory variables for religiosity. [See Appendix for more detail on the description of
the related survey of the data].
The main variable is the percentage of population who are members of religious
congregations. This is from year 2000 survey dataset. The individual adherence rate of main
groups; Mainline, Evangelical, and Catholic denominations are just added to investigate any
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possible individual impact of them4. They are not in the core attention of the hypothesis but as a
side issue are addressed in the Appendix.
Choosing religious adherence percentage as the main proxy for level of religiosity was
based on two reasons. First past literature (Azzi and Erenberg, 1975; Lipford and Tomlinson,
2003; Barro 2004; Gruber, 2005) implemented this measure in different levels (national or cross
countries) of studies. Second availability of data with specified location has been a limitation.5
For the other religious variable, religious diversity, a relatively common measure of
fractionalization is used. Gini-Simpson index as shown below represents the plurality or
diversity.

It simply determines the probability that two random entities selected from a

population would represent the same type.

∑(

)

where, Lci is the number of individuals in county C that belongs to religion (denomination) i. Lc
is the total population of county C. So as

is higher and closer to 1, county C shows higher

level of denominational plurality. This measure here mostly captures the diversity among
Christianity‘s different main denominations. Mainline, Evangelical, Catholic, Orthodox and
others are the main groups used to calculate the fractionalization index.
2.4.3 Covariates
Several control variables based on previous literature of entrepreneurship [e.g. Mojica et al.
(2009) and Henderson (2006)] are included in the empirical models.

4

Note that the selection of individual denominations is solely based on the rank of the denomination membership
share in the total adherence population. Also Latter-day Saints denominations are excluded in this study.
5
GSS data set does not include geo information. This is the reason despite its advantages it is not used here.

20

Demographic Characteristics (Ωi):
A higher skilled labor force is expected to be more productive and probably has potential to
manage an entrepreneurial activity (Goetz and Freshwater, 2001; Evans and Leighton, 1989;
Bates, 1993; Audretsch and Fritsch, 1994; Malecki, 1994; Bregger, 1996; Robson, 1998).
That is why education attainment measured by percentage of population with a bachelor or
higher degree, is included in the model and expected to have a positive relationship with
dependent variable. However the type of education is a key in its relationship with
entrepreneurship. One can imagine high tech education or more technical engineering degrees
help individuals to start up their business in the related fields. But degrees in sciences might not
necessarily be like that and may help the graduate to find a job in a public school or institute.6
Locations with higher average income per capita can be attractive for entrepreneurs to
start their business or expand their networks. So it is expected that counties with higher average
income would be a safer or more suitable platform for growing entrepreneurship. Therefore per
capita income is another control variable. Also higher unemployment rates raise the odds of layoffs and the relative returns to self-employment and, therefore, increase the share of
proprietorships in all jobs.
Population density is a typical criterion to be considered of some significance in
explaining the level of self-employment or other aspects of entrepreneurial potentials especially
when the rural economic variables are matter of concern. Median age of residents of counties
also is another demographic characteristic included.

6

This is a concern that should be addressed in future research.
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Regional Characteristics (πi):
Owner-occupied homes and median housing values in counties are considered as control
variables. Homeownership and higher housing values significantly enhance proprietors‘ ability
to secure finance they need (Robson, 1998). Therefore it is expected that higher percentage of
homeownership and higher housing value would be associated with higher entrepreneurial
potential.
It is expected that counties with higher level of connectivity to the transportation network
show a higher level of entrepreneurship. So a dummy variable accounting for access to interstate
highways serves as another measure for infrastructure.
Another variable included is the level of natural amenity rank for counties, as measured
by climate and a number of related variables (McGranahan, 1999), and it is expected, ceteris
paribus, higher level of amenities to be associated with higher potential for entrepreneurship.
This index takes values between 1 to 7 and the higher the better natural amenities representing
county has. Finally, rural-urban continuum code is used in the regressions as another control
variable. Ranging from 1 to 9, this code shows the continuum of metro to rural counties. The
higher the code is, the more rural feature (less population and less adjacency to metro area) it
has.
Policy Characteristics (∆i):
Government can directly impact entrepreneurship at any level. Particularly, taxes, government
spending and regulations are important in this analysis. Per capita federal government
expenditure as a potential positively related variable and also property tax revenue set of the
local governments, are included. These account for the potentials of infrastructure provision.
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Counties with higher infrastructure can be attractive for new businesses and therefore be
effective in the entrepreneurial potential of accounted locality.
Finally, I use Small Business Survival Index (SBSI) to capture the effect of various
government policies on self-employment and small firms‘ growth. This annually reported index
put together 32 to 38 different government-imposed or government related costs which directly
or indirectly impact entrepreneurial activities in state level. The major areas of concern are taxes
(income, capital gain, corporate, etc.) and regulations (health care, minimum wage, workers‘
compensation, etc.). The lower the value of index, the lower government imposing cost would
be, or the state is more entrepreneurship friendly.
This leads to the following general model of entrepreneurship level in county i :

One important point should be noted here. The analysis is a cross-section. But most of the
variables are averaged out throughout a period of a decade. Religious variables are all from year
2000; entrepreneurship variables however are simply the average for years between 2000 to 2009
or 2010. Control variables are mixed of averaged and level. Table 2.1 presents the summary of
statistics and their sources.
2.5
Methodology
Following the theoretical argument and explanations of the variables and data, in this section the
empirical method to test the hypothesis is presented.
I first check the possible relationship between religious factors and entrepreneurship
measures with an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) baseline regression.
(1)
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where Y denotes the dependent variable, entrepreneurship level and X represents the matrix of
independent variables including religiosity, religious diversity and all the control variables.
Simple OLS result has some useful insight for motivating the hypothesis of the paper but
definitely it is not enough. Results are shown in Table 2.2.
Results present different signs for coefficients of religious factors in the two regressions.
This can simply tell that in the two regressions, dependent variables are capturing different parts
of entrepreneurship. In other words, the relationship that we observe among religious factors and
entrepreneurship is different for the two dependent variables. One may argue that the mechanism
through which religion impacts self-employment is different from that or small firms‘ growth.
But both of the variables are representing entrepreneurial potentials. Table 2.2 shows that an
increase of one percent rate of adherence will decrease the rate of self-employment by 0.14
percent but it increases the growth of small firms. Moreover counties with diverse range of
congregational members experience lower self-employment rate but higher small firms growth.
These inferences cannot be very reliable due to the arguments that follow. As one of the
main contributions of the paper, I want to discover the possible spatial behavior of the two main
variables, religious factors and entrepreneurship. If it is confirmed that indeed there is a spatial
dependency, then OLS result cannot be reliable.
2.6
Spatial Dependence
Although counties (the unit of analysis here) are well differentiated units, the underlying spatial
correlation among them can sometimes be difficult to distinguish using these boundaries,
particularly with respect to religious adherence and the nature of labor market. These
overlapping spatial relationships could cause problems with the framework used to collect
information from these localities. For example, religiosity variables may not line up with the
24

borders of the county. It is likely that some of the adherents in a particular church live in a
different county. The data on membership and adherent figures were collected by the localities in
which the congregation itself is located, rather than by the state in which individuals actually
reside. So this shows an implicit spatial effect. Also the measures of entrepreneurial potentials
(the dependent variables) can have the same behavior. One county‘s entrepreneurship level can
be dependent on the economic factors including self-employment of the neighboring counties.
Therefore, any empirical analysis of issues in regions or localities should take these overlapping
relationships into consideration. Figure 2.1 and 2.2 present the maps for religious adherence rate
and self-employment in the US counties respectively. By a general view of these maps, we can
observe some source of spatial dependency trace for these two variables.
In the presence of spatial effects, the estimated parameters without spatial correction can
be inefficient and/or biased. Previous studies on related topics including income growth using
US county- and state-level data have confirmed that these regional cross-sectional data display
spatial dependence (Rey and Montouri, 1999; Rupasingha et al., 2002). This can be a guideline
to extend the argument for entrepreneurship variables as well. One can claim that the selfemployment rate in West Virginia and Kentucky might share more similarity than that of West
Virginia and California. The same thing can be expected for religious parameters.
Spatial dependence in a model can be due to different reasons. On one hand the
dependent variable in one locality can be influenced by the same variable in neighboring
locations. If this is the case, the Spatial Autoregressive Model (SAR) should be used. On the
other hand, spatial dependence could be presented in the residuals when there are omitted
unobservable variables that can be spatially correlated. In this case, the Spatial Error Model
(SEM) is estimated to correct the spatial bias.
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But besides these, if the relationship between independent variables of concern
(religiosity and religious diversity here) and the dependent variable (entrepreneurship) have
spatial components, then we should think of some other types of models. This means that for
example religious adherence rate of one county affects the self-employment rate in the
neighboring county. In that case, Spatially Lagged Explanatory Variables Model (SLX) should
be estimates. But if not only we see the spatial dependence between religious factors and
entrepreneurship but also an auto-spatial dependence in entrepreneurship variable, then Spatial
Durbin Model (SDM) is the specifications to use. So in general possible specifications are as
follow:
SAR:

(2)

SEM:

(3)

,

SLX:

(4)

SDM:

(5)

where; Y denotes an nx1 vector of the dependent variable, X represents an nxk matrix containing
the independent variables, and W is a spatial weight matrix.7 Scalar
parameter,

denotes scalar spatial error parameter,

for the explanatory variables, and

denotes a spatial lag

denotes the k parameters to be estimated

is the scalar representing the weighted independent

variables.
Now which of these model specifications would explain the spatial behavior of the
variable better? A careful model selection procedure is conducted to answer this question.
Besides Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test, an algorithm suggested by Elhorst (2010) has been
followed to conclude the most desired model. The Elhorst‘s suggested procedure is as follows:
first by using LM test it is checked if the OLS model can be rejected in favor of either SAR or
7

The weight matrix is 5-nearest neighbor weight matrix. However LeSage and Pace (2010) describes that if the
model specification is well selected, estimate results are not sensitive to weight matrix structure.
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SEM or both. Whichever model is picked it will be used in a likelihood ratio (LR) test against
SDM model. Finally if any of the SAR or SEM would pass the test, they will be the ―best‖
model, otherwise SDM will be picked.
After doing so, it turned out that Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) has the most favorable
data generating process for the current data set. LM test8 results and the detail of Elhorst
procedure and its results are presented in the Appendix A.
Having SDM as the ―best‖ model suggests that there is a possibility for a spatial behavior
not only in the entrepreneurship variables, but also in the relationship between independent
variables and dependent one. It means self-employment and other entrepreneurial measures in
one county affect the same parameters in neighboring counties. Moreover religious factors (and
control variables) of neighboring counties would impact county‘s entrepreneurship.

2.7
Results and Discussion
The regression results of all alternative specifications, SAR, SEM and SLX are presented in the
Appendix, (Table A2.3 through A2.5). Here I focus on the results from the main model, SDM,
presented in Table 2.3.
It seems that religiosity and religious diversity both show positive and significant total
impact on entrepreneurship. So for example if adherence rate goes up with one percentage
points, rate of self-employment grows by 0.07 percentage points, and growth rate of small firms
will increase by 0.03 percentage points. Also a unit change in religious diversity would change
self-employment by 7.7 percentage points and small firms‘ growth by almost 4 percentage points
in the same direction. For a more detail analysis, we need to look into the direct and indirect
effects. Direct effect refers to the impact of religious factors on entrepreneurship in the same

8

A MATLAB code written by Donald Lacombe is used. Available on:
http://community.wvu.edu/~djl041/matlab.html
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locality, and indirect effect points to the relationship between the two variables over the borders
of the counties.
2.7.1 Direct Effects
Share of self-employment and growth rate of small firms present negative relationship with
religiosity of the same county. Higher number of people as members of religious congregations
is associated with less entrepreneurial activities. So this result simply state that more religious
counties would have lower potential for entrepreneurship. Such relationship can be explained as
follows.
First, as mentioned before, teachings of religion and the set of rules and frameworks it
provides affect the economic behavior of individuals. One channel through which it can affect
entrepreneurial activity is risk-taking behavior. The idea of risk taking is in the heart of
entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs in general are risk takers. This particular behavioral
characteristic however is not quite promoted by religious teachings. In contrast, most of the
religions one way or the other promote the spirit of conservatism which values the hard and
―good‖ work within the established frame and not a revolutionary or radical change. The
relevance of the relationship of risk behavior and religious belief set has been looked at from
different angles in the literature. Most of the empirical studies have tested this relationship in the
individual micro level (Rupasingha and Chilton, 2009). For example Leon and Sepulveda (2012)
examine the relationship between level of religiosity of individuals and their saving/investment
preferences. They find religious people are significantly more cautious and risk-averse than nonreligious ones. Along the same line, here I expand the reasoning to aggregated level of adherents
in one locality, and expect more religious society to be more conservative and less risk-loving.
Secondly, membership and contributing to the religious service have opportunity cost.
One can claim instead of going to church or spending resources on religious related activities,
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individuals can participate in ―productive‖ economic tasks. This is somewhat a classic argument
in the literature which looks at religion as a consumption good with a large set of substitutes
(Barro and McCleary, 2003).
So these two reasons would mainly explain why we see negative impacts of religiosity on
entrepreneurship. Also there can be some other minor reasoning too, for example certain types of
businesses and economic activities are not very welcome to grow and expand in religious
localities. Although it may sums up to a small portion of self-employment and firms, but it still
can be a source for such relationship between religious factors and dependent variables.9
The direct effect of religious diversity shows opposite sign for the two different
dependent variables. More religiously diverse county would have significantly lower rate of selfemployment but higher growth rate for its small firms. Small businesses, due to higher
opportunity and bigger market that they would have, grow more in diverse societies. However in
the same time a fractionalized society consisting of different religious group, with a potential of
competition and not getting along well, may result in lower level of productive activities. So the
different sign for the direct effect of religious diversity can partially be explained within these
two strands of logic.
2.7.2 Indirect Effects
In contrast to the direct effect, for both dependent variables we see positive indirect effect of
religious factors. Higher religiosity and religious diversity promote entrepreneurship in
neighboring counties. Part of such relationship can be explained due to the mobility of the
entrepreneurs. This means that one county is not attractive for entrepreneurial activities because
of higher religiosity of it, and this make the entrepreneur to move to neighboring counties.
Considering the direct effect of religiosity on entrepreneurship, religious communities are not
9

One area that is needed to be studies in further research is to break up the self-employment and small firms by
industry and occupation. That will give a more detailed and clear idea of the causal mechanism.
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attractive to entrepreneurs. They may move to neighboring localities which are not necessarily as
religious as the original county.
Here I bring up four individual examples of neighboring counties and the way
entrepreneurship and religiosity have been associated to each other. In figures 2.3 through 2.6,
four cases of neighboring counties within one state and cross different states are shown with the
related data points of adherence rate, self-employment and small firms‘ growth. For example in
figure 2.3, Belmont county in Ohio shows a steadily higher adherence rate of around 60 percent
in comparison to its neighbors in West Virginia (Wetzel and Tyler counties). Also it presents
significantly lower self-employment rate and small firms‘ growth. These counties are much
related in the sense of mobility of labor and the connectivity between them. Figure 2.4 looks at
the same issue in the state of New York. County Otsego in the neighboring location of counties
Montgomery, Herkimer and Oneida presents lower religiosity and higher entrepreneurial
potential. Same argument for the other two figures presented can be brought up.10
Overall, we can see that high religiosity in one county result in more entrepreneurs
deciding to live in surrounding localities. Such positive indirect impact is due to the significant
tie between the direct and indirect effect.
2.7.3 Entrepreneurship spillover effect
The rho coefficient, that shows the spillover effect of dependent variable, is significant for both
small firms‘ growth and self-employment ratio. This suggests that after controlling for spatial
variation of independent variables, entrepreneurship show spatial distribution. This dependence
seems to be more significant for small firms‘ growth. The reason can be that the relationship
among firms is not limited to the borders of counties and this can be claimed for small businesses

10

It is important to note that these individual examples are not the base of reasoning. But since they satisfy the logic
presented in here, they are listed as examples. Certainly there are other examples that not necessarily support the
argument and can even be used as counter-argument.
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as well. This argument cannot be stated with the same level of confidence for the number of selfemployees.
2.7.4 Control variables
The results for control variables to a large extend satisfy the expectations. The significance and
the magnitude are quite stable for the models of the two dependent variables. For example the
per capita income level has a positive direct but negative indirect effect on self-employment and
small firms‘ growth rate. So higher level of income in one county promotes more entrepreneurial
activities, but more income level in neighboring counties would draw the entrepreneurs away
from the accounted county. Therefore it seems income level is an attractive variable for
entrepreneurs. Education level however, has different direction of impacts for the two models.
Higher education directly leads to lower self-employment but higher growth of small firms. But
indirectly it benefits both of the entrepreneurship variables. One way to explain this is that
people with higher degree of education, would be qualified to work for a bigger organization or
company, which provide a higher level of salary in comparison to self-employment. So indirectly
income is an incentive that channels the education‘s impact on entrepreneurship.
Government per capita expenditure and population density both show very small
negligible impact on entrepreneurship. Natural amenity index, as expected, affects the level of
self-employment and small firms‘ growth positively.

The METRO variable represents the

metro-rural continuum index. As the index increases the accounted location is more rural and
less connected to metro areas. Results show that as counties which are more rural have higher
self-employment but lower growth of small firms. The coefficient for the highway access
variable shows that more connected counties experience lower self-employment. Finally, as it
was expected, more restriction of government on the market by taxation and regulations causes a
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decrease in the level of entrepreneurship. The coefficient for Small Business Survival Index is
negative directly and indirectly for both models.
2.7.5 Denominational variables results
In section 5 of the Appendix (Table A2.6), I included the short version (covariates are not
presented in the table) of SDM results for denominational adherence rate variables. ―MAINRT‖,
―EVANRT‖ and ―CATHRT‖ represent the percentage of population who are members of
Mainline, Evangelical and Catholic congregations respectively.
Including these variables overall does not change the significance and the signs of control
variables. The rate of adherence to Mainline congregation, positively affects self-employment
but negatively impacts small firms‘ growth in counties. Almost the same pattern can be seen for
the other two congregational adherence rates. Significance and magnitude vary but the direction
of impacts is quite the same among them.
2.8

Conclusion and Discussion
The purpose of this paper was to examine whether religious adherence rate and religious

diversity can partially explain the entrepreneurship level in the U.S. counties. Also the spillover
effect and the spatial behavior of these variables were in the core of the research question. Two
main variables for measuring entrepreneurship are self-employment rate and growth of small
firms.
After testing five different specifications of models and reporting the results, it turned
out that the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) was the most appropriate. In this model, not only the
spatial behavior of entrepreneurship is considered, but also the effects over the borders for
religious factors would be accounted.
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The results indicate that religiosity is not beneficial for self-employment rate and growth
of small firms in the same locality. But it has positive effects on neighboring counties‘
entrepreneurial potential. The effect over the borders of counties (indirect effect) exceeds the
direct effect; therefore the total impact of religious factors are positive.
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Appendix A
A2.0 Related Literature
Tome (1984) investigates the role of religious and denominational backgrounds on earnings and
the returns to human capital, but he finds no evidence to support the connection between the two.
Steen (1996) tests the correlation among earnings differentials and rates of return to human
capital for different religious backgrounds using data from the National Longitudinal Survey. His
findings indicate that men raised as Catholics have a significantly higher income than men raised
as Protestants. Also Jewish men have significantly higher earnings than men raised in all other
religious traditions. Sander (2002), using General Social Survey (GSS) data, investigates the
endogeneity between human capital and religious activities. He finds that education is not an
exogenous determinant of attendance at weekly religious services and religious contributions,
and there is no causal effect of education on religious activity when education is treated as
endogenous. Fan (2008) formulates a theoretical model of linking religion and education. His
model attempts to combine sociological and economics literature and shows that people‘s
religious participation is determined by the concern for their children‘s human capital
accumulation as well as their religious beliefs.

A2.1

Short explanation on the religious adherence data

Data on religion factors are from a study designed and completed by the Association of
Statisticians of American Religious Bodies (ASARB), which represents statistics for 149
religious bodies on the number of congregations within each county of the United States. Where
available, also included are actual membership (as defined by the religious body) and total
adherents figures. Participants included 149 Christian denominations, associations, or
communions (including Latter-day Saints and Unitarian/Universalist groups); two specially
defined groups of independent Christian churches; Jewish and Islamic totals; and counts of
temples for six Eastern religions. Totally 741 variables and 3142 cases are reported. The study
and data collection were completed in between 1999 to 2001. The 149 groups reported 268,254
congregations with 141,371,963 adherents, which is 50.2% of the population of 281,421,839.
There are 14 non-participating religious bodies that reported more than 100,000 members to the
Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches, 2000, including all historically African
American denominations. These groups reported a combined membership of 31,040,360 in the
Yearbook, which is not reflected in the congregations and membership data. The lack of
historically African American denominations should be noted when referencing the number of
total adherents or denominations in an area.
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A2.2

LM-Tests Results

The following two tables show the LM test results for the two dependent variables. It can be
concluded that between SAR and SEM models, SEM is a better specification for both.
1Table A2.1: LM Test---Dependent Variable SELFEMP

TEST
LM-Lag
LM-Lag Robust
LM-Error
LM-Error Robust

LM-test Statistics Value
44.2765068949088
52.7679596459724
94.1171226289587
102.627032589765

P-Value
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

2Table A2.2: LM Test---Dependent Variable AVEGROW

TEST
LM-Lag
LM-Lag Robust
LM-Error
LM-Error Robust

LM-test Statistics Value
534.439133135445
3.19754333675235
572.222956579739
41.2023000073454

P-Value
0.00
0.073748973195264
0.00
0.00

A1.3 Elhorst (2010) model selection procedure
For the dependent variables, the following procedure is presented and the results are reported
here.
1. LM test points to the ―better‖ model among OLS, SAR and SEM.
2. The ―better‖ model (either SEM or SAR) would be tested using the likelihood ration (LR)
with the following two hypotheses:

If the first hypothesis cannot be rejected, SAR is the model and we cannot use SDM. And
if the second hypothesis cannot be rejected, SEM would be the best model and we should
discard SDM. If opposite of any of above happens, SDM should be selected. As it is
shown below, it happens to be the case and Spatial Durbin Model selected as the primary
specification.
 Dependent Variable: SELFEMP
 LM-test result confirms that SEM is a better DGP than SAR and OLS.
 LR-test
Test
SAR vs. SDM

LR-test Statistics Value
260.3446

p-Value
0

Test
LR-test Statistics Value
p-Value
SEM vs. SDM
211.4362
0
Given both LM and LR test, SDM would be the best model for SELFEMP variable.
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Result
SDM

Result
SDM

 Dependent Variable : AVEGROW
 LM-test result confirms that SEM is a better DGP than OLS and SAR.
 LR-test
Test
SAR vs. SDM

LR-test Statistics Value
102.3254

p-Value
0

Result
SDM

Test
LR-test Statistics Value
p-Value
Result
SEM vs. SDM
72.811
0
SDM
Given both LM and LR test, SDM would be the best model for AVEGROW variable.
Note: One other step is to compare the OLS and SLX. This would follow the same procedure,
but since SDM results (rho coefficients) are significant overall we can claim that SDM procedure
is the better model.
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A2.4

Alternative Models Results

3Table A2.3:SAR Results
Self-employment rate
(SELFEMP)

Dependent Variable

Annual Average Growth rate of small firms
(AVEGROW)

Total
27.763
(9.074)

Direct

Indirect

Total
-1.48
(-2.9)

Direct

Indirect

Percent rate of all denominations adherence (TOTRT)

-0.18***
(-8.40)

-0.16***
(-8.40)

-0.02***
(-8.39)

0.003
(0.65)

0.002
(0.65)

0.001
(0.64)

Religious Diversity Index (RELDIV)

-21.27***
(-7.44)

-18.15***
(-7.43)

-3.11***
(-7.43)

2.03***
(2.73)

1.20***
(2.74)

0.829***
(2.69)

Per capita Income (INC)

0.336***
(7.635)

0.28***
(7.633)

0.04***
(7.63)

-0.012
(-1.10)

-0.007
(-1.10)

-0.005
(-1.10)

Percent of population with at least bachelor degree
(EDU)

-0.18***
(-5.54)

-0.15***
(-5.54)

-0.02***
(-5.54)

0.07***
(9.19)

0.04
(9.31)

0.03***
(8.03)

Median Age (MEDAGE)

-1.22*
(-1.78)

-0.86
(-1.28)

-0.36
(-0.94)

0.76**
(2.84)

0.55*
(1.99)

0.20*
(1.75)

Population Density (POPDEN)

-0.031
(-1.38)

-0.020
(-1.389)

-0.009
(-1.389)

-0.012**
(-2.51)

-0.002**
(-2.52)

-0.09**
(-2.47)

Per capita Federal Expenditure (GOVEX)

-0.08***
(-5.44)

0.05***
(-5.44)

0.03***
(-5.44)

0.21***
(-8.48)

0.18***
(-8.93)

0.02***
(-7.22)

Percent of Houses occupied by owners (HOUSOWN)

0.011**
(1.98)

0.008**
(2.55)

0.004**
(2.33)

0.211**
(2.12)

0.105*
(1.66)

0.094*
(1.85)

Median value of Housing (MEDHVAL)

0.052**
(2.04)

0.009**
(2.41)

0.041**
(2.05)

0.094*
(1.84)

0.073
(1.59)

0.002*
(1.74)

Percentage of population unemployed (UNEMP)

-0.007*
(-1.77)

-0.006**
(-1.99)

-0.000**
(-1.99)

0.000*
(1.96)

0.000
(1.23)

0.000
(1.11)

Small Business Survival Index (SBSI)

-1.00***
(-5.47)

-0.84**
(-1.98)

-0.15**
(-2.50)

-2.05***
(-4.88)

-1.95**
(-2.75)

-0.10***
(-3.11)

Property Tax Revenue (PROPTAX)

0.10***
(8.76)

0.08***
(8.766)

0.01***
(8.74)

-0.003
(-1.21)

-0.002
(-1.21)

-0.001
(-1.20)

Natural Amenity Index (NATAMEN)

1.21***
(6.40)

1.03***
(6.404)

0.17***
(6.39)

0.24***
(5.51)

0.147***
(5.41)

0.101***
(5.39)

Rural-Urban Index (METRO)

0.76***
(8.97)

0.65***
(8.97)

0.11***
(8.96)

-0.054**
(-2.55)

-0.032**
(-2.55)

-0.022**
(-2.51)

-3.159***
(-7.78)

-2.69***
(-7.71)

-0.46***
(-7.77)

-0.146
(-1.404)

-0.086
(-1.40)

-0.059
(-1.39)

Constant

Interstate Highway access (HWY)

rho

0.15***
(143.85)

0.432***
(21.97)

R-squared
Rbar-squared

0.160
0.1571

0.1617
0.1589

log-likelihood

-9753.2676

-4323.9742

***Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level.
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4Table A2.4 :SEM Results
Dependent Variable

Self-employment rate
(SELFEMP)
Coefficient

Constant

t-stat

33.63***

Annual average growth of
small firms
(AVEGROW)
Coefficient
t-stat

(12.37)

-1.21**

(-2.05)

Percent rate of all denominations adherence (TOTRT)

-0.19***

(-16.59)

0.007**

(-2.04)

Religious Diversity Index (RELDIV)

-21.08***

(-18.12)

0.925**

(2.10)

Per capita Income (INC)

0.318***

(8.22)

0.002

(0.32)

Percent of population with at least bachelor degree (EDU)

-0.192***

(-6.61)

0.044***

(9.11)

Median Age (MEDAGE)

1.27**

(2.55)

-0.76*

(-1.98)

Population Density (POPDEN)

-0.021

(-1.57)

-0.009***

(-2.04)

-0.03***

(-5.47)

-0.15***

(-9.04)

Percent of Houses occupied by owners (HOUSOWN)

0.001*

(1.66)

0.198**

(2.59)

Median value of Housing (MEDHVAL)

0.007*

(1.78)

0.027*

(1.75)

Percentage of population unemployed (UNEMP)

-0.005*

(-1.91)

0.013

(0.97)

Small Business Survival Index (SBSI)

-1.124**

(-2.81)

-0.015**

(-2.61)

Property Tax Revenue (PROPTAX)

0.1126***

(10.13)

0.000

(0.19)

Natural Amenity Index (NATAMEN)

0.996***

(7.52)

0.167***

(4.52)

Rural-Urban Index (METRO)

0.674***

(9.58)

-0.055***

(-4.14)

Interstate Highway access (HWY)

-2.918***

(-8.26)

-0.082

(-1.36)

Per capita Federal Expenditure (GOVEX)

lambda

0.254***
(11.42)

0.473***
(40.70)

R-squared

0.2038

0.3174

Rbar-squared

0.2012

0.3152

log-likelihood
-9728.8134
***Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level.
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-4309.217

5Table A2.5:SLX Results
Self-employment rate
(SELFEMP)

Dependent Variable

Annual average growth of small firms
(AVEGROW)

Coefficient
3.50

t-statistic
0.781

Coefficient
-5.31***

t-statistic
-6.47

Percent rate of all denominations adherence (TOTRT)

-0.21***

-9.23

0.007**

-1.736

Religious Diversity Index (RELDIV)

-19.03***

-6.82

1.42**

2.78

Per capita Income (INC)

0.315***

7.74

0.002

0.367

Percent of population with at least bachelor degree (EDU)

-0.193***

-6.57

0.046***

8.57

Median Age (MEDAGE)

1.008*

2.05

-1.057*

-1.98

Population Density (POPDEN)

-0.005

-1.63

-0.045**

-1.72

Per capita Federal Expenditure (GOVEX)

-0.24***

-5.30

-0.50***

-8.64

Percent of Houses occupied by owners (HOUSOWN)

0.001***

5.23

0.003***

6.27

Median value of Housing (MEDHVAL)

0.003**

2.44

0.007**

2.41

Percentage of population unemployed (UNEMP)

-0.003*

-1.80

-0.002**

-2.46

Small Business Survival Index (SBSI)

-1.551**

-2.23

-1.348***

-4.68

Property Tax Revenue (PROPTAX)

0.171***

11.32

0.002

0.72

-0.106

-0.35

0.042

0.773

Rural-Urban Index (METRO)

0.650***

7.11

-0.059***

-3.56

Interstate Highway access (HWY)

-2.903***

-7.913

-0.070

-1.04

Weighted Percent rate of all denominations adherence (WTOTRT)

0.27***

8.23

0.037***

6.192

Weighted Religious Diversity Index (WRELDIV)

25.49***

5.998

2.26***

2.907

Weighted Per capita Income (WINC)

-0.370***

-5.42

-0.043***

-3.461

Weighted Percent of population with at least bachelor degree (WEDU)

0.376***

7.34

0.028***

3.026

Weighted Median Age (WMEDAGE)

0.248*

2.15

-1.551**

-2.88

Weighted Population Density (WPOPDEN)

0.085

0.41

-0.171

-0.342

Weighted Per capita Federal Expenditure (WGOVEX)

0.02

1.254

0.08

0.708

Weighted Percent of Houses occupied by owners (WHOUSOWN)

-0.081**

-2.55

-0.203*

-1.79

Weighted Median value of Housing (WMEDHVAL)

-7.522*

-1.60

-0.002

-0.94

Weighted Percentage of population unemployed (WUNEMP)

0.198*

1.61

0.024*

1.98

Weighted Small Business Survival Index (WSBSI)

0.004*

1.88

0.543

1.58

-0.167***

-8.99

-0.007**

-2.092

1.63***

4.72

0.334***

5.29

Constant

Natural Amenity Index (NATAMEN)

Weighted Property Tax Revenue (WPROPTAX)
Weighted Natural Amenity Index (WNATAMEN)
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Table A2.5 cont’d :SLX Results
Weighted Rural-Urban Index (WMETRO)

0.416***

3.028

0.007

0.306

1.76*

2.484

0.10

0.825

Weighted Interstate Highway access (WHWY)
R-squared

0.233

0.203

Rbar-squared

0.228

0.197

***Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level.

A2.5 Denominational Results
6Table A2.6 :SDM Results
Self-employment rate
(SELFEMP)

Dependent Variable

Annual average growth of small firms
(AVEGROW)

Total
0.0074**
(2.01)

Direct
0.00
(-0.002)

Indirect
0.007
(1.29)

Total
-0.003***
(-3.44)

Direct
-0.002***
(-3.33)

Indirect
-0.0004
(-0.36)

Percent rate of
Evangelical
denomination adherence
(EVANRT)

0.007***
(2.82)

-0.003
(-0.698)

0.0108**
(2.078)

-0.003***
(-5.57)

-0.0000
(-0.097)

-0.03***
(-3.68)

Percent rate of Catholic
denomination adherence
(CATHRT)

0.0009
(0.335)

-0.008**
(-1.82)

0.009*
(1.868)

-0.004***
(-6.22)

-0.001
(-1.408)

-0.003**
(-3.28)

Religious Diversity
Index (RELDIV)

6.093
(1.220)

-18.98***
(-7.02)

25.08***
(4.83)

6.002***
(5.09)

1.5820**
(3.428)

4.420***
(3.8871)

Percent rate of Mainline
denomination adherence
(MAINRT)

0.146***
(141.84)

0.413***
(20.92)

R-squared

0.244

Rbar-squared

0.237

0.2391
0.2325

log-likelihood

-9607.6264

rho

-4237.6

***Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level
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Table 2.1 : Descriptive Statistics and Sources
Variables
Description
Entrepreneurship
SELFEMP
AVEGROW

Mean

(Non-farm Proprietor Employment/Total Non-farm Employment)*100: Averaged
2000-2010
Average Annual Growth of small (less than 500 employees)firms
Averaged 2000-2009

Religion
TOTRT
MAINRT
EVANRT
CATHRT
ORTHRT
OTHERRT

All Denominations—Percent Rate of adherence in Year 2000
Mainline Denominations—Percent Rate of adherence in Year 2000
Evangelical Denominations-- Percent Rate of adherence in Year 2000
Catholic Church-- Percent Rate of adherence in Year 2000
Orthodox Denominations-- Percent Rate of adherence in Year 2000
Other Denominations-- Percent Rate of adherence in Year 2000

RELDIV

Religious Diversity Index-Year 2000

Other Variables
INC
EDU

Std.Dev.

Min

Max

Source*

23.98

9.23

3.045243

68.53041

BEA-REIS

-0.0718

1.65

-13.27569

17.22222

USCB

53.2298
14.1949
22.8218
13.807
0.0637
2.34

18.26162
11.38461
16.9146
14.85797
0.25
8.56

1.816347
0
0
0
0
0

98.379
88.40
99.37
94.68
3.78
74.21

0.532

0.23

0.004

0.99

ARDA
ARDA
ARDA
ARDA
ARDA
ARDA
ConstructedARDA

Per capita Income(in thousands of dollars): Averaged 2000-2010
28.77
6.75
13.63
98.37
BEA
% of Population (25 years and older) with bachelor or higher degree
15.62
5.93
3.78
70.15
USCB
Averaged 2000-2010
MEDAGE
Median age of population: Year 2000
35.21
3.55
21.91
54.73
USCB
HOUSOWN
Percent of homes occupied by owners: Averaged 2000-2010
73.41
7.38
17.65
88.24
USCB
MEDHVAL
Median value of housing(in ten thousands of dollars): Averaged 2000-2010
6.453
3.284
1.498
48.831
USCB
UNEMP
Percent of Population who are unemployed : Averaged 2000-2010
7.18
2.48
0.53
38.2
USCB
GOVEX
Per capita Federal Government Expenditure (in thousands dollars):
6.914
4.012
1.206
15.868
USCB
Averaged 2000-2004
PROPTAX
Property Tax Revenue (% of total Revenue): Year 2002
62.6175 18.15813
2
93
USCB
SBSI
Small Business Survival Index: Averaged 2000-2010
60.91
12.75
27.55
88.82
SBEC
NATAMEN
Natural Amenities Index (1-7)
3.492
1.04
1
7
ERS-USDA
METRO
Rural-Urban Continuum Code (1-9)
5.14
2.67
1
9
ERS-USDA
POPDEN
Population Density (Hundreds of population per square mile) in Year 2000
2.35
13.655
0.00044
669.401
BEA-REIS
HWY
Dummy for Interstate highway access (0-1)
0.4364
0.4960
0
1
Constructed-USCB
*BEA-REIS: Bureau of Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Economic Information System; ARDA: Association of Religion Data Archives; USCB: U.S. Census Bureau,
SBEC: small Business & Entrepreneurship Council
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7Table 2.2 :OLS Results
Dependent Variable

Self-employment rate
(SELFEMP)
Coefficient t-stat

Annual average growth of small firms
(AVEGROW)
Coefficient
t-stat

Constant

28.84***

(9.34)

-2.67***

(-4.84)

Percent rate of all denominations adherence (TOTRT)

-0.14***

(-7.87)

0.005*

(1.76)

Religious Diversity Index (RELDIV)

-17.06***

(-6.96)

1.65***

(3.76)

Per capita Income (INC)

0.27***

(7.23)

0.002

(-1.10)

Percent of population with at least bachelor degree (EDU)

-0.13***

(-4.85)

0.05***

(10.15)

Median Age (MEDAGE)

1.56**

(2.66)

-0.59*

(-1.66)

Population Density (POPDEN)

-0.081

(-1.49)

-0.005**

(-2.36)

Per capita Federal Expenditure (GOVEX)

-0.24***

(-5.20)

-0.11***

(-8.98)

Percent of Houses occupied by owners (HOUSOWN)

0.003***

(5.38)

0.007***

(4.21)

Median value of Housing (MEDHVAL)

0.05**

(2.84)

0.08**

(2.88)

Percentage of population unemployed (UNEMP)

-0.0004*

(-1.99)

-0.008

(-1.18)

Small Business Survival Index (SBSI)

-0.98***

(-4.33)

-2.14***

(-6.44)

Property Tax Revenue (PROPTAX)

0.087***

(8.97)

0.003

(-0.79)

Natural Amenity Index (NATAMEN)

1.22***

(7.85)

0.28***

(10.09)

Rural-Urban Index (METRO)

0.73***

(10.20)

-0.05***

(-4.04)

Interstate Highway access (HWY)

-2.72***

(-7.83)

-0.057

(-0.92)

R-squared

0.1698

0.1752

Rbar-squared

0.1671

0.1725

***Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level.
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8Table 2.3:SDM Results
Self-employment rate
(SELFEMP)

Dependent Variable

Annual average growth of small firms
(AVEGROW)

Total

Direct

Indirect

Total

Direct

Indirect

0.068**
(2.17)

-0.212***
(-10.15)

0. 28***
(7.703)

0.033***
(3.847)

-0.008**
(-2.22)

0.041***
(4.97)

Religious Diversity Index
(RELDIV)

7.72*
(1.66)

-19.08***
(-7.30)

26.81***
(5.66)

3.97***
(3.51)

1.24**
(2.76)

2.73**
(2.535)

Per capita Income (INC)

-0.07
(-1.03)

0.31***
(8.42)

-0.39***
(-5.09)

-0.043**
(-2.32)

0.001
(0.16)

-0.04**
(-2.50)

Percent of population with at
least bachelor degree (EDU)

0.20***
(3.46)

-0.19***
(-6.93)

0.40***
(6.91)

0.079***
(5.37)

0.04***
(9.63)

0.033*
(2.43)

Median Age (MEDAGE)

1.54**
(2.03)

1.20*
(1.84)

0.32
(0.84)

-2.08*
(1.74)

-1.83*
(1.81)

-0.96
(1.42)

Population Density (POPDEN)

-0.003
(-1.10)

-0.012*
(-1.73)

0.041
(0.35)

-0.088
(-1.58)

-0.034**
(-2.21)

-0.053
(-0.40)

Per capita Federal Expenditure
(GOVEX)

-0.42
(-1.42)

-0.54***
(-5.39)

0.11
(1.10)

-0.61**
(-2.57)

-0.63***
(-9.54)

0.01
(0.733)

Percent of Houses occupied by
owners (HOUSOWN)

0.002**
(2.15)

0.000*
(1.74)

0.000
(1.11)

0.015***
(4.59)

0.007*
(2.03)

0.007
(1.59)

Median value of Housing
(MEDHVAL)

0.008*
(1.88)

0.006
(0.94)

0.001
(0.91)

2.104
(1.22)

0.942
(1.05)

1.162
(0.94)

Percentage of population
unemployed (UNEMP)

-0.128*
(-1.73)

-0.142
(-1.26)

0.014
(1.12)

-1.005**
(-2.48)

-0.912*
(-1.67)

-0.089
(-0.79)

Small Business Survival Index
(SBSI)

-2.004**
(-2.54)

-1.86***
(-2.84)

-0.144**
(-2.49)

-1.885***
(-3.09)

-0.945***
(-3.57)

-0.938***
(-3.42)

Property Tax Revenue
(PROPTAX)

0.00
(0.02)

0.17***
(12.28)

-0.17***
(-8.97)

-0.006*
(-1.79)

0.001
(0.65)

-0.008*
(-2.00)

Natural Amenity Index
(NATAMEN)

1.51***
(6.90)

-0.14
(-0.54)

1.66***
(5.05)

0.38***
(6.89)

0.035
(0.72)

0.34***
(4.92)

Rural-Urban Index (METRO)

1.05***
(7.76)

0.66***
(7.44)

0.39**
(2.58)

-0.06*
(-1.82)

-0.05***
(-3.72)

0.00
(-0.15)

Interstate Highway access
(HWY)

-1.01
(-1.26)

-2.92***
(-8.27)

1.90**
(2.36)

0.43
(0.22)

-0.076
(-1.25)

0.120
(0.66)

Percent rate of all denominations
adherence (TOTRT)

rho

0.187***
(21.531)

0.443***
(4.200)

R-squared

0.234

0.2065

Rbar-squared

0.229

0.2013

log-likelihood

-9623.0953

-4272.8115

***Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level.
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Figure 2.1: Religious Adherence in the U.S.

Data: Religious Adherents as Percentage of Population, Year 2000
Source: Religious Congregations and Membership Study: 2000, ASARB

Figure 2.2: Self-employment in the U.S.

Data: Share of Self-Employment to Total Employment, Year 2000
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis-Regional Economic Information System
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Figure 2.3: Counties comparison over states border: OH-WV

County

Adherence
Rate

SelfEmployment

Small Firm
growth

Belmont, OH

58.86%

12.35%

-3.2%

Wetzel, WV

41.07%

26.12%

0.08%

Tyler, WV

30.42%

20.11%

-1.07%

County

Adherence
Rate

SelfEmployment

Small Firm
growth

Otsego, NY

33.84%

17.35%%

0.32%

Montgomery, NY

70.07%

12.33%

-0.53%

Herkimer, NY

54.61%

14.78%

-0.06%

Oneida, NY

52.13%

10.08%

-0.26%

Figure 2.4: Counties comparison within state: NY
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Figure 2.5: Counties comparison over states border: WV-VA

County

Adherence
Rate

SelfEmployment

Small Firm
growth

Hardy, WV

31.07%

44.52%

0.31%

Highland, VA

56.58%

24.05%

-0.64%

Bath, VA

55.48%

8.81%

-0.53%

Alleghany, VA

53.73%

14.18%

-1.06%

Figure 2.6: Counties comparison within state: CA

County

Adherence
Rate

SelfEmployment

Small Firm
growth

Alpine, CA

54.90%%

19.41%%

-2.23%

El Dorado, CA

26.38%

26.84%

0.86%

Calavares, CA

31.48%

28.97%

-0.03%

Tuolumne, CA

27.03%

21.18%

-0.06%
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Chapter 3
Institutional Quality and Efficiency of Public Spending: Evidence from the
U.S. States Governments
3.1
Introduction
One of the governments‘ biggest challenges is to develop policies that raise the standard of living
without creating large income gaps between the rich and the poor. Depending on the time span
and more importantly political and social ideology of governments, pro-growth or pro-equity
policies are implemented, however pursuing both seems to be the ―better‖ strategy in the longrun. There is a significant debate over the relationship between these two types of policies in the
literature. Equality and Efficiency, the Big Tradeoff by Okun published 1975 is one classic
example that thoroughly explains how and why there is a trade-off.
Besides these arguments, several studies have shown different relationships between
economic growth and income equality. Although some believe they are negatively correlated,
there are studies claiming that growth promotes equality or vice-versa (Angeles-Castro, 2006).
There is a set of tools in hands of the state by which they can decide how to impact the size of
pie and how to distribute it. Scholars argue that redistribution of wealth is the major function of
government, and also it is the main source of growth in the size of fiscal state (Peltzman, 1980;
Tullock, 1983). Basically if we want to examine the governments‘ action toward either or both
direction of growth and equality, we need to analyze the tools it has, e.g. fiscal policies, and see
how it uses them.
Behind the debate on trade-off between growth and equality, there is an important
question that opens a door to another literature which is closer to the main argument of this
paper. Regardless of the direction that the government picks and follows, given the fact that both
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higher growth and more equally distributed income are favorable goals, the efficiency of the
public sector is very important. How effective are governments‘ policies in changing economic
performance and equality simultaneously? More specifically we are interested to know why
some governments are more effective in pursuing equality and efficiency than the others. Which
factors drive the differences between them? Our concentration here is particularly on efficiency
of public expenditure in achieving higher growth and income equality.
We think besides all systematic and structural factors, institutions and their quality are
very important in changing the effectiveness of governments‘ action. Hence we focus on some
areas of institutional arrangements to address the research question. In summary the core
research question of the current paper is: Does institutional quality impact the efficiency of
government spending?
In the empirical investigation we use state-level observations from 50 state governments
in the U.S. The proposed hypothesis is as follows: ―States with higher institutional quality have
more efficient public spending to reach higher growth and equality.”
The main findings confirm that there is enough evidence to support the above hypothesis.
However it should be clearly defined and differentiated what specific institution we are referring
to. In particular we find that states with a better judicial system and less restrictive labor market
tend to have more efficient public spending. Furthermore political affiliation of legislature and
executives are included in the analysis and there are some mixed results for them.
Our contribution to the existing literature of efficiency of public spending and also
institutional analysis can be categorized into three parts. First the methodology that we use to
measure the efficiency, although used in other literatures, to our knowledge has not been
employed to address the same question with these variables. Second, the scale of study which is
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state level, considering the factors we include in the analysis, is new. Finally connecting the two
parts on measuring efficiency and institutional consideration is our other contribution.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section an overview of the related studies
on public spending efficiency and institutions is presented. After that we explain the research
design, variables and data. Section 5 will present the major results and findings and finally
section 6 states the concluding remarks.
3.2

Literature Review

Much of the variation in growth rates and income inequality across economies and over time is
still not completely understood. Although cross-country studies, based on dynamic panel data
techniques, have been able to correct some of the methodological problems in the earlier
literature (such as measurement and specification errors, simultaneity bias, and the potential
causality), conclusive empirical results have yet to be obtained. The same issue exists when we
compare the local economies (Hughes and Edwards, 2000).
One variable that has been studied extensively is the role of fiscal policies, such as public
spending, on growth and equality. Since the seminal contribution by Barro (1990), there have
been a number of analytical studies highlighting the various channels through which public
expenditure may affect growth. But, at the empirical level, robust relationships have been
difficult to capture. In general the studies on the effects of government expenditure on growth
appear to have various conclusions. Almost the same argument can be brought up about income
distribution and the impact of government expenditure on it. There are studies in favor of a
positive relationship between government expenditure and lower inequality, e.g. Afonso et al.
(2008). But there are some which confirm the negative correlation (De Mello and Tiongson,
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2006). Overall there is no clear consensus on the direction of the possible effects of public
spending on either growth or equality.
For the purpose of this paper, we focused on two segments of the literature. One is on the
issue of effectiveness of government spending and the other consists of studies concerned about
institutions.
3.2.1 Public Spending and its Efficiency
Public fiscal spending can be instrumented to stimulate any economy‘s performance both in the
short run and in the long run. There is a lengthy literature consisting of theoretical and empirical
studies that focuses on the extent to which public expenditure, income transfers and taxation
impact the growth and overall economic performance (Tolmie, 2007). Fox (1999) points out the
importance of assessing public sector performance in maintaining a prosperous economy and
promoting growth. Barro (1990) discusses the potential for long-run growth that is derived from
infrastructure investments. In addition, there is a sizeable literature focusing on fiscal
expenditure and its aggregate economic effects (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002).
In the past twenty years, attention of scholars, especially in macroeconomic analysis, has
shifted toward the idea of efficiency of public spending. In a general sense, this efficiency simply
refers to how successful policies are to fulfill the goals. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) and Gupta et
al. (2011) are among several studies that focus on different ways of assessing public spending
effectiveness. Pritchett (2000) and Keefer and Knack (2007) besides spending, investigate the
efficiency of public investment as well. A few recent studies (e.g., Afonso et al., 2005; Afonso
and Aubyn, 2005) have performed efficiency analyses using OECD data, but they do not explain
the sources of variations in efficiency across countries.

50

Previous studies on the efficiency of the public sector in economic performance found a
significant divergence of efficiency across countries and subsectors of governments. Education
and health are the two sections that have been more analyzed. Fakin and Crombrugghe (1997)
examine the efficiency of government subsidies in central European countries. Gupta and
Verhoeven (2001) look into the education and health spending in African countries while
Clements (2002) and Aubyn (2003) test education in Europe.
In general there are two major branches of the empirical literature on efficiency of
government spending. One is the macro/country-level and the other one is on local governments.
Afonso, Schuknecht, and Tanzi (2005, 2006) examine public expenditure efficiency in economic
performance in the OECD countries and in emerging markets. De Borger and Kerstens (1996),
and Afonso and Fernandes (2006) find evidence of spending inefficiencies for the local public
sectors. Afonso, Schuknecht, and Tanzi (2008) investigate the efficiency of taxation and some
other fiscal policies in order to decrease income inequality in OECD countries.
Most of these studies for calculating the efficiency of public sector apply the Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method. This is the same model we will be using here, however in
the context of a state-level analysis for public spending efficiency in growth and income
equality. To the authors‘ knowledge no work has been conducted using such a non-parametric
method.
3.2.2 Institutions
Among the fundamental sources of long-run economic development, institutions have received
considerable attention in recent years. North (1990) defined institutions as the ―rules of the game
in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction‖.
The most obvious formal institutions are the formal rules (constitutions, laws, and property
rights) and informal institutions (conventions and codes of behavior such as norms, customs,
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taboos, and traditions). North further stated that institutional change shapes the way societies
evolve through time and, hence, the direction of economic performance.
Numerous empirical studies have provided convincing evidence to support the view that
differences in institutions can have a large effect on output per capita, including Knack and
Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2002), Rodrik (2002), Rodrik et al.
(2004), Eicher and Leukert (2009). These empirical studies rely on a limited range of datasets to
measure institutions or ―institutional quality‖ and moreover they all study national economies
and compare countries. In the studies using institutions and their quality, always measurement is
an important issue. There are several projects in which scholars offer some proxies for
quantifying the quality of institutions.
One relatively recent developed measure is Economic Freedom Index (EFW) introduced
in Gwartney, Lawson and Block (1996). The index number is ranging from zero to ten for each
country. As the number gets higher the economic environment is closer to free market and as it
gets close to zero, the country has less economic freedom and lower institutional quality. A
relatively large portion of research in this literature uses this index as a proxy for institutional
quality (e.g. Haan, 2003; Berggren, 2003; Gwarteny, Holcombe and Lawson, 2004; Ayal and
Karras, 1998; De Haan and Siermann, 1998; Carllson and Lundstrom, 2002). These studies use
EFW to check the relationship of institutions with growth, income level, income distribution and
several other socio-economic parameters. Some few papers examine effect of economic freedom
on both growth and equality together. Scully (2002) shows economic freedom is significantly
affective on both.
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One other quantitative index for institutional quality is conducted by Kaufmann et al.
(2008), World Governance Indicator (WGI). This index has six subcomponents11 by which
some aspects of institutions are measured.
In this paper, since we are interested in institutional arrangement in the local level and not
national level, the approach as well as variables used will be slightly different from those
employed in country-level studies. We need to come up with some sort of representative of
state‘s institutional quality that has two properties. First it is not an outcome of a process (i.e. it is
exogenous). Second it can be well represented by a quantifiable variable.

3.3
Empirical Design, Variables, and Data
For testing the hypothesis, we essentially take two steps. First we need to find a way to define
and calculate the ―efficiency‖ of public spending. For this purpose a non-parametric method,
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), is employed. It is, to our knowledge, the first time in the
related literature that this method is used to answer this research question. Second, we check if
the efficiency has any correlation with institutional quality.
3.3.1 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), a non-parametric method, was originated from Farrell
(1957) frontier analysis and popularized by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). The DEA
procedure allows for an estimation of the level of technical effectiveness in a production process.
There is a long literature with application of DEA in different areas related to efficiency or
productivity of production units. Emrouznejad (2001) lists almost 500 studies that use DEA as an
evaluation tool. In the urban and regional studies DEA method has a broad use. Usually topics of

11

Voice and accountability, Political stability and absence of violence, Government effectiveness, Regulatory
quality, Rule of law and Control of corruption.

53

these studies are related to the efficiencies of industries or local governments (Tong, 1996;
Hajalmarsson, 1992; De Borger, 1996).
DEA employs linear programming to compare decision making units (DMUs) which
produce multiple outputs using multiple inputs. A production frontier is estimated without any
form of production technology being specified. This frontier indicates the maximum possible
output given a certain level of input. The term ―envelopment‖ comes from the fact that the
frontier envelops the set of observations. This frontier will then serve as a base for calculating
the relative effectiveness (efficiency) of the DMUs. Units are either on or below the frontier.
Each DMU‘s efficiency is defined relative to that of all others. So at a specific level of
input the DMU with highest output would be the most efficient and then other DMUs will be
ranked with respect to that one particular DMU. The efficient unit cannot increase the amount of
one of its output without decreasing other output or increasing the inputs. So clearly DMUs are
facing an optimization problem. The base of optimization process is as follows.
For each DMU, the model finds the optimal linear combination of units in the sample
which produces higher output level with fewer inputs. This linear combination represents a
hypothetical composite unit that should satisfy two constraints:
1. All output levels are greater or equal to the output level of the DMU under analysis.
2. All input levels of the composite unit are less than or equal to the input levels of the analyzed
DMU.
The model searches for comparison that identifies output slack or excess input usage of
the unit under analysis, as defined by the above inequality conditions. Suppose we have n DMUs
and each unit has k inputs and produces m outputs. The DEA model can be sketched with the
following mathematical programming for a given
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(2)

Excess Input

(3)



With

n
j 1

ij  1 ,

Where;
:(
:
Y :(
X :(
:(
:(
:(

) vector of the outputs for
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) output matrix
) input matrix
) vector of weights assigned to linear combination of comparison set
) vector of output slack
) vector of input excess
:
) and
) vectors of weights used in the evaluation process of the objective
function.
The objective function in output-oriented model is to maximize the proportional increase

in outputs produced with a given level of inputs, equation (2). For the input-oriented model the
objective is to maximize the proportional decrease in the input necessary to produce a given level
of output, equation (3). DEA models can be either variable return to scale (VRS) or constant
return to scale (CRS). Choosing the return to scale, CRS versus VRS, In case the weights
determining hypothetical composite comparison,

,sum to one, model is VRS, otherwise it is

CRS.
The model used in this paper is an input-oriented DEA with variable return to scale.
Choosing the orientation of DEA is arbitrary, as there is a duality between the two methods
(input versus output orientation). But return to scale depends on the computational characteristics
of the model. The frontier set for CRS models are larger than that for VRS counterparts.
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Therefore our focus here is on the objective function subject to restriction in equation (3). The
units of analysis, as discussed before, are state governments in the U.S.
Basically we are assuming an implicit production function for each state. For these
production functions there is one input and two outputs. By comparing states to each other we
can define a relative efficiency for them.
Input & Outputs, Efficiency Scores
The input we use in the DEA in this paper is general public expenditure at state level. In the
literature there are diverse subsets of public spending included in the model for calculating the
efficiency. Here however, we only implement the main general expenditure per capita. By
general expenditure, we consider intergovernmental as well as direct expenditure. However it
does not include federal transfers. So this is specifically expenditure spent and financed by state
governments and not federal government. Data for general state government expenditure is from
the Census Bureau on state government finance.
For the outputs, there are two factors we included; per capita GDP growth and inverse of
gini coefficient. These two represent the two areas we assume as the result of the public sector
policies, one representing economic performance and the other distribution of income. Per capita
GDP growth is from Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) based on real GDP per capita in 1997
dollar. Data for measure of inequality, gini index, is from a project by Mark Frank that provides
a detailed dataset on several measures of income inequality in the state level from 1945 to very
recent. This gini is a net measure and not transfer. Since here the actual output we are looking for
is equality, simply by subtracting gini from one (1-gini) we can have a proxy for income
equality.
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Table 3.2 presents efficiency score for 50 states using DEA. These scores are based on
averaged input and outputs for the time range between 1998 and 2005. It seems Arizona and
Idaho have the most efficient public spending and Alaska and Wyoming with 0.28 and 0.49 are
among the least efficient states. These numbers basically refers to the distance of each DMUs
(state) from the frontier (or from the most efficient ones). As the numbers get smaller they show
a further distance from the frontier. For example Alaska which has the score almost equal to 30%
which means that this state does not use 70 percent of its input to produce the two outputs and
therefore it acts inefficiently. Figure 3.1 also shows the calculated efficiency score on graph. As
it is shown, states with higher score are closer to the frontier and less efficient ones, e.g. Alaska
are far from it.12
3.3.2 Testing the relationship between efficiency and Institutions
In the second part of empirical analysis, we use the efficiency scores calculated by DEA method
in regression set-up to test the hypothesis. Simply we want to see if institutions have any
significance to explain the variation of efficiency among states. The general specification of the
model would be:
(4)
Where EFFi represents the efficiency score of state i, and INSi is a matrix of different measures
of institutional quality for state i.

12

As a simple representation of how the efficiency score is calculated, for example on the graph in figure 3.1, to
calculate efficiency score of Oregon, we need to divide its distance from the origin by the distance of the frontier to
origin: OA/OB
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3.4
Explanatory Variables: Institutions
The area of our interest in this essay for explaining the difference in states‘ public spending
efficiency is institutional quality. Obviously there can be a long list of different institutions,
formal or informal. But we focus on some formal institutions that have the characteristics of
structuring the economy rather than being output of policies.13
Judicial System Quality
The quality of judicial system is one essential factor in development. A powerful judicial system
which enforces and protects property rights is an important basis for economic growth and
development. Moreover this judicial system (for example of a state) can directly impact the cost
of participating in businesses. Also judicial decisions affect the cost of mandates and in general
businesses regulations (Hall and Sobel, 2007). So overall we can say that judicial systems in
states are important and their quality can change the rules of game. Therefore we include a
measure of quality of judicial system in the model.
This measure is an index based on a survey of lawyers conducted by the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce that started in 2002 and basically ranks states‘ legal liability system. The index gets
values between 0 to 100, as the higher value refers to a ―better‖ judicial system. It covers some
areas such as juridical impartiality, judicial competence, and general treatment of tort and
contract litigation. These areas are reflected in the survey questions that have been conducted
among approximately 1000 randomly selected lawyers across the country.
When judicial system has a reliable performance in protecting and enforcing the rights,
the institutional baseline would be provided for economic activities, including governments‘
13

For example some informal institutions such as culture, norms, or religion certainly in the big picture would be
relevant. But for two reasons we are not concerned about them. First our study is state-level, therefore variation in
such institutions among states is minimal if none. Secondly, informal institutions cannot be the variables that are
affected (or justified) by governments.
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policies. This is why our expectation is to see a significant and positive correlation between
judicial system quality and efficiency of public spending.
Labor Market
Labor market is one important sector and its institutional changes make the economic out puts
vary. The structure and composition of labor forces and most importantly the regulations on the
labor market are the major factors to consider for an institutional comparison between
economies. In this paper we control three aspects of the labor market by including three
variables.


Right-to-work

In the United States, under the 1947 federal Taft-Hartley Act, some states have passed a law that
bans union security agreements. This law is called right-to-work. It simply means in the states
with this law, unions and employers are forbidden from entering into agreements that require
employees to join a union and pay dues and fees to it in order to get or keep a job. Currently
twenty four states have the right-to-work law. Most of them are southern and western states.
Michigan and Indiana just very recently in 2012 passed the state law for right-to-work. See the
Appendix for the list of states. Data for this variable is from Department of Labor.
The variable we include is a dummy for right-to-work. We think that this direct
regulation of the state governments can affect the institutional arrangement of a state and
ultimately the effectiveness of its fiscal tools such as public spending.


Union Density

Along with the idea for including the right-to-work parameter, union density variable is another
explanatory factor. Union density is measured as the percentage of nonagricultural employees‘
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population who are members of unions. Hirsch, Macpherson and Vermon (2003) put together a
dataset on union membership and coverage in states from the year 1973 up to recent years.
We understand the clear correlation between this variable and right-to-work and that is
why we use them in different specifications. Union membership (density) can basically be
assumed as a variable which is the result of particular regulation, e.g. right-to-work. Therefore, it
may not be necessarily a variable representing the institutional arrangement of a state, but only a
direct output of some institutional set-ups.


Labor Market Freedom

This is a broad area under which one component of Economic Freedom Index of North America
(EFNA) is calculated (See Appendix for description of the index and its components). Area 3 of
EFNA which is on regulation has one component on labor market regulations, 3A. This segment
itself consists of three parts. Overall this variable represents how a state or provincial
government in the North American countries (US, Canada and Mexico) is free of government
regulation. Minimum wage legislation, percentage of government employment and union density
are the areas considered. The expectation is to see less regulations and restriction on labor
market would lead to more efficient public spending. In an economy where labor forces are free
to choose their economic action, we would imagine governments‘ justification to the economy
will work with less friction and ultimately more efficiently.
An important note is that all these three variables have high correlations and including all
together would be problematic. The point is to capture the institutional quality (particularly here
in the labor market) as much as possible. So we use the three variables in different specifications.
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Political Affiliation
Quality of political institutions is certainly one key variable that is repeatedly shown in
development literature to play an important role in economic performance. The structure of the
political body in any government at any level is one determinant of how states manage their
finances. When we are discussing the political arrangement in the governments of states in the
U.S. we are particularly interested to analyze the political affiliation of two main players. On one
hand we have the legislature section which includes Senate and House of Representatives. On
the other hand we have the executive sector with governors. It can be a shortcoming of the
breadth in analyzing political institutions, if we just examine the affiliations. However even by
simplifying the complicated political system to only what party politicians belong to, we still can
to some extent capture the role of politics in our dependent variable of concern (i.e. efficiency of
public spending). This criticism can be more significant when we are looking only at the two
major political parties in the U.S. It is because there might be cases under which, for example
one state‘s legislature by majority be Democratic but in the voting and decisions they act with
the Republican preferences. So being member of a party does not necessarily mean satisfying the
party goals in every occasion.
For legislature political affiliation, we look into the majority of states senate and house of
representative separately. Then by combining the two, we have one measure, as a dummy that
represents the general legislature sector‘s affiliation. For example if for one state in the senate 60
percent of politicians are republican and in the house only 30 percent are republican, we can say
that overall the majority of legislature politicians in that state are Democrats. Therefore the
dummy variable would get value of zero. In the case of republican majority, the dummy variable
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would get value of 1. This variable is constructed based on the data from National Conference Of
States Legislatures (NSCL).
Same argument, but less complicated is applied for the executive sector by taking
governors‘

political

affiliation.

National

Governors

Association

(NGA)

provides

a

comprehensive datasets on political affiliation of governors along with so many other details for
a relatively long period of time.
Summary of variables descriptive statistics is presented in Table 3.1. Note that all
variables are from a pooled observation for year 1998 to 2005.
3.5

Empirical Analysis

Table 3.3 presents Ordinary Least Square (OLS) results for nine different specifications. In these
regressions observations for the time period between 1998 to 2005 are pooled. In the
specifications with more independent variables, size of sample is smaller. This is because of data
availability of some variables. For example Judicial System Quality is available only for a
limited time range. Models 1 through 6 essentially represent the bivariate regressions between
efficiency scores and our six major explanatory variables.
As it was expected, quality of judicial system is positively associated with the efficiency
score. All the three measures we included for the labor market quality confirm that less
regulations and more freedom in the labor market are favorable for effectiveness of government
spending. As the coefficient of union membership variable (MEM) with high significance shows
negative effect on efficiency, we can claim that states with more union power tend to be
spending less efficiently.

The same argument can be stated for positive and significant

coefficient of right-to-work variable. For political environment variables, it seems that only
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legislature political affiliation matters for efficiency of public spending. The results show that a
Republican majority legislature on average is associated with more efficient public spending.
Model 7, 8 and 9 include all the variables but in none of them the three labor market variables
are present simultaneously. The reason for that, as discussed before, is that labor market
variables are highly correlated and having them together in the regression would cause problems.
Although choosing one model is not the concern here but comparing the three specifications, 7
through 9, we can see that model 8 has a better goodness of fit.
So given model 8, as the judicial system quality index increases by one unit, efficiency
score increases by 0.2 percent. An increase of one unit in Economic Freedom Index will make
the score go up by almost 12 percent. Also states with Republican majority in legislature, on
average have 5 percent higher efficiency score than state with Democrat majority.
3.6
Conclusion
Empirical studies in different levels confirm that better institutions can provide a basis upon
which economic activities and policies can be delivered better. In general institutions matter and
they impact the development through different channels.
This paper examines the relationship between institutional set-up and government
spending efficiency in the U.S. states. After using a non-parametric method, we calculate the
efficiency score for each state. This number simply represents that relative to all other states,
how efficiently one state spends its general expenditure. The considered outputs for
governments‘ fiscal policy are higher growth and more equally distributed income.
Our final finding shows that higher quality of judicial system and less regulatory labor
market are positively associated with the public spending efficiency. The political affiliations of
legislature and executives have mixed results depending on the specification. However there is
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empirical evidence that show, states with republican legislature have more efficient government
spending in comparison to democrat states.
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Appendix B
9Table A3.1: List of States with Right-to-Work

State
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Louisiana
Michigan
Mississippi
Nebraska
Nevada
North Carolina
North Dakota
Oklahoma
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Wyoming

Year Constitutional Amendment Adopted

Year Status Enacted
1953

1946
1944
1968

1947
1947
1943
1947
1985

State law, 2012
1947
1958
1976

State law, 2012
1960
1946
1952
1948
2001
1946

1954
1947
1951
1947
1947
2001
1954
1947
1947
1993
1955
1947
1963

10Table. A3.2: Component Areas of Economic Freedom of North America Index

Area 1: Size of Government
EFAI: Govt. consumption expenditures as a percentage of GSP
EFAII: Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GSP
EFAIII: Employment insurance, workers compensation, and other pensions as a percentage of
GSP
Area 2: Takings and Discriminatory Taxation
EFBI: Total Tax Burden as a Percentage of GSP: Includes income taxes, consumption taxes,
property and sales taxes, contributions to Social Security plans, and other taxes
EFBII: Top marginal income tax rate and the income threshold at which it applies
Area 3: Labor Market Freedom
EFCI: Minimum wage legislation: Annual income earned by an minimum-wage worker divided
by per- capita GSP
EFCII: Government employment as a percentage of total employment
EFCIII: Union density
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Table 3. 1: Descriptive Statistics and Sources
Variables

Description

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Source*

Out-puts
GROWTH

GDP per capita annual growth: 1998-2005

2.01

2.08

-6.1

8.73

BEA

EQUAL

1-GINI : 1998-2005

0.42

0.03

0.32

0.47

Frank (2009)

4358.25

1394.34

2590.54

14293.02

59.10

8.62360

24.8

78.6

17.23

8.64356

2.3

26.9

0.443

0.496

0

1

In-put
GOVEXP

General Government Expenditure per capita (current US $) : 19972005

USCB

Institutional Quality
Judicial System
JUDQ
Labor Market
MEM

Judicial System Quality: 2000-2005

ILR

Hirsch et al.(2003) –
CPS
DOL

RTW

% employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement (Union
Density): 1998-2005
Dummy for Right-to-Work law: 1997-2005

EFI3

Economic Freedom Index, Area3A: Labor market freedom: 1995-2005

6.587

0.912

5.7

8.7

Dummy for governors‘ political affiliation
(1=Republican, 0=Otherwise): 1997-2005

0.544

0.498

0

1

NGA

0.497

0

1

NSCL

Political Affiliation
EXPOL

Dummy for legislature political affiliation
0.451
(1=Republican, 0=Otherwise): 1997-2005
Note: LEGPOL is combined of two parts for senate and house of representatives.
Dummy for majority of state senators political affiliation (1= Republics, 0=Otherwise) : Upper House
Dummy for majority of state representative political affiliation (1= Republics, 0=Otherwise): Lower House
LEGPOL sums the two to one single variable.
LEGPOL

Fraser Institute

* USCB: U.S. Census Bureau; ILR: Institute for Legal Reform-U.S. Chamber of Commerce; CPS: Current Population Survey; DOL: Department of Labor; NSCL: National
Conference of State Legislatures; NGA: National Governors Association

66

11Table 3.2: DEA efficiency Score Results
State

Rank Score

State

Rank Score

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

19
49
1
23
40
11
46
43
10
7
45
1
18
4
16
12
24
25
32
17
41
31
36
28
5

Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

38
13
14
8
39
44
47
15
34
22
20
33
26
37
30
2
3
6
21
42
9
35
29
27
48

0.858605
0.284865
1
0.808817
0.644066
0.922843
0.550338
0.612993
0.935968
0.958467
0.598762
1
0.862171
0.986195
0.871033
0.919886
0.798556
0.798416
0.745318
0.869091
0.631095
0.746541
0.694067
0.760939
0.978236
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0.674764
0.917713
0.900145
0.939656
0.669249
0.605133
0.498708
0.873438
0.727558
0.812861
0.856174
0.729146
0.785606
0.678885
0.747209
0.999569
0.990624
0.976008
0.825933
0.6228
0.936366
0.700492
0.750736
0.776634
0.493295

12Table 3.3: OLS Regression Result; Dependent Variable: Efficiency Score: pooled 1998-2005
(1)
0.612
(8.88)**

(2)
0.874
(28.54)**

(3)
-0.129
(-1.06)

(4)
0.635
(36.17)**

(5)
0.698
(32.11)**

(6)
0.659
(33.86)**

(7)
0.818
(12.29)**

(8)
-0.260
(-2.17)*

(9)
0.588
(8.34)**

Judicial System Quality (JUD)

0.003
(2.29)*

-----

-----

-----

-----

-----

0.001
(1.26)

0.002
(2.15)*

0.002
(1.56)

Percent employees member of union(MEM)

-----

-0.015
(-6.54)**

-----

-----

-----

-----

-0.013
(-7.49)**

-----

-----

Economic Freedom Index-Area3 (EFI3)

-----

-----

0.119
(6.77)**

-----

-----

-----

-----

0.124
(9.38)**

-----

Right-to-Work (RTW)

-----

-----

-----

0.129
(4.89)**

-----

-----

-----

-----

0.129
(6.04)**

Governors‘ political affiliation (EXPOL)

-----

-----

-----

-----

-0.009
(-0.31)

-----

-0.018
(0.91)

-0.024
(-1.28)

-0.025
(-1.23)

Legislature political affiliation (LEGPOL)

-----

-----

-----

-----

-----

0.060
(2.23)*

0.049
(2.21)*

0.047
(2.28)*

0.048
(2.06)*

Observations
R-squared

200
0.03

450
0.09

450
0.09

450
0.05

439
0.00

441
0.01

193
0.29

193
0.37

193
0.23

Constant

**Significant at 1% level, * Significant at 5% level
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.001

Figure 3.1: DEA frontier for US states
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Chapter 4
Religious Heterogeneity, State Religiosity and Conflict
4.1

Introduction

Several pioneer social scientists such as John Stuart Mill, Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber
promoted the general idea of the ―secularization theory‖. The core of this theory is that, in the
modern world, importance of religion in the political sphere would decline. In other words it
claims religion would be marginalized from public to the private sector (Nordas, 2005).
However in recent decades almost all over the globe we can observe the empowerment of
religion, particularly in the political scenes. As Haynes (1997) discusses, almost all countries
around the world have been experiencing some sort of political tension with the background of
religious dispute. There are a large number of real examples that let us think secularization
theory has been strongly challenged14. For example Gill & Keshavarzian (1999) find that
opposite of what ―old-line secularization thesis‖ claims, religious organizations and leaders
remain or are becoming increasingly active in political and social life. This transmits into the
mobility of the adherents and followers to taking action. Majority of ethno-religious conflicts are
originated from this idea. Casanova (1994) refers to the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, as a
key point that shifted religion back into the public contestation. He argues that besides Iranian
revolution, the rise of solidarity movement in Poland, role of Catholicism in Sandinista and
Evangelicalism in American politics were all developments that somewhat negate the idea of
secularization even further. These changes all continue after the cold war up until very recent
―war on terror‖.
14

See Berger (1999); Stark (1999); Stark & Finke (2000).
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There is no doubt that religion have distinctive role in some of the most repeated conflict
zones of the world. For example the bloody conflicts in Algeria, Chechnya, Kashmir, Nigeria,
Northern Ireland, Israel–Palestine, Lebanon, Sudan and Sri Lanka, and the civil war in
Afghanistan (Hasenclever & Rittberger, 2000; Fox, 2000; Seul, 1999). Although we cannot state
that these incidences were all exclusively religious conflicts, but clearly some religious factors
have been in the heart of the confrontations15.
Considering all of these and so many other events that have happened in the recent
decades, religion has become one of the most attractive topics in the academic studies and public
debates on conflict. Not religion per se, but more precisely religion and its functions in political
and social changes.
The current paper looks into the impact of religion on the domestic societal conflicts in
countries. It investigates two questions, one which has been raised in the related studies before
and one new question to the literature. In both of the questions, focus is on the religious
heterogeneity of countries. In the first hypothesis, the impact of religious diversity on the
magnitude of conflict is tested. In the second one, role of government and its religious identity is
included in the analysis. Particularly I want to see if the level of religiosity of state impacts the
connection between religious diversity of a society and the magnitude of conflict.
The main contribution of this paper is its research question which has not been examined
before. Correlation between conflict and different types of heterogeneity, e.g. ethno-lingual and
cultural, have been studied, but religious diversity is rarely being paid attention to. Moreover, as
the more important part of the contribution, role of state religiosity, up to my knowledge, has not
15

On a different intensity level but yet similar forcing mechanism, we can refer to a large part of political
instability and social movements in the Middle East in past four years, known as Arab Spring, with focusing
on religion as one of the key issues.
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been included in this analysis before. Also the expansion of data set by number of countries and
time span is another contribution.
The paper is organized as follows. Next section presents related studies with the focus on
theoretical background. Section 3 is about the variables and data used in the model. A brief
explanation of empirical method is presented in section 4, and it is followed by empirical
analysis of results. Finally section 6 is the conclusion.
4.2
Literature Review and Theoretical Argument
In the past half-century almost one third of the nations around the world have experienced some
level of civil war or political unrest. Blattman and Miguel (2010) show that since 1960 twenty
percent of countries have had at least ten years of civil war and that portion has steadily
increased peaking in 1990s. Some examples of Afghanistan, Lebanon and Somalia can represent
the depth and length of these instabilities.
Due to the significance of this important issue, there has been a well-established literature
on the concept of conflict in general and moreover the roles of socio-economic determinants of
it. Ethnicity, culture and religion have been magnified within this literature. Political scientists
and sociologists primarily, and economists to some extend have studied conflict.
The literature on conflict theorizes three main conditions under which (religious) groups
would participate in violent actions. First is the issue of social frustration. Gurr (1993) argues
that one main reason for societal violence with the religious background is when one or several
(religious) minorities face deprivation circumstances for a period of time. This may ultimately
erupt in form of social mobilization which has been originated from those frustrations (Dollard et
al., 1939; Galtung, 1964).
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Second, the essential factor that can increase the risk of conflict is the access of groups to
resources. Basically if there are potential rebel groups which have reached to a certain level of
social frustration, but no access to enough resources to mobilize their members, they cannot
initiate any serious violent action. Gradually these rebel groups with no resource would die out
(Tilly, 1978). So having enough opportunity and sufficient access to resources are key factors for
an actual initiation of violent action.
Finally, a primary step in the formation of groups is conflicting identity. When a person‘s
individual identity sets in line with its group identity, an individual as a member can possibly be
mobilized to take action for the group. However this depends on a long list of parameters, one of
which is the size of the group. Now if the society as a large group fails to keep a stable group
identity (e.g. national identity), threat of violence and defensive actions will rise (Stryker and
Burke, 2000; Bloom, 1990). The separation of individual and group identities is fairly common,
but considering an identity (particularly an identity with religious theme) for members of a big
group, such as population of a country, is very complicated and almost impossible (Seul, 1999).
The two conditions of identity differences and frustration are the more important
backbones of ethno-religious conflicts throughout the history. I focus on these two segments of
theory of conflict as the basis for my theoretical argument in this paper.
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4.2.1 Confrontation of Identities and Conflict
Nordås (2004) categorizes the perspectives in understanding of identity (in political analysis) to
three main groups: primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism.
Some social scientists have more primordialistic view to identity and claim that cultural
factors such as ethnicity or religion are fixed characteristics of groups. For example Vanhanen
(2000) argues that group identities are stable basis when analyzing conflicts. Hasenclever and
Ritterger (2000) claim that primordialists refer to difference among religious traditions as the
major explanatory variable for violent interaction among nations. The famous theory of ―clash of
civilization‖ by Huntington (1993) is one of the most important theoretical studies that embrace
primordialistic view. He sees ethno-cultural differences among countries to be rooted in the
relatively constant differences among civilizations (that countries originally belonged to).
Furthermore he argues that conflicts in the twenty first century are going to be all based on these
differences, and segregations or alliances will continue to grow on basis of these differences.
There are some criticisms against this view of identity in the context of conflict. Smith
(1996) brings up the lack of parameters of time and location in the primordialistic paradigm. He
argues that without theoretical explanation on specific incidences, we cannot generalize the
reasons for conflict to the differences in identities. Pfaff (1993) gives multiple examples on
historical peaceful relations between nations with not only different, but also confronting
identities (e.g. some countries in Balkan and Sub-Saharan states) (Welsh, 1996; Newbury, 1983;
Lamarchand, 1972).
Opposite of primodialistic view, there is a paradigm of instrumentalism which looks at
identity differences as an instrument in the hands of states (political power) to achieve social or
economic goals (Nordas, 2004). In this perspective, religious identities play significant roles
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leading conflicts only if religion (as a whole) is manipulated by political power. Carment(1993)
assumes conflict (by any background or nature) is a function of political differences rather than
ethnic, cultural or religious heterogeneity.
So in summary we can say that, these two views have a fundamental difference. While
primodialists think that difference in identities per se, is the source of conflict, instrumentalists
believe there are so many other factors (bundled in social/political benefits) that play roles in a
conflict situation.
Connecting these two views is the constructivism perspective. This paradigm offer a
middle point position, where identity differences are the key initiator of conflict, but the action of
political power is perceived as the catalyst for violent instabilities (Nordas, 2004).
Constructivists believe that the combination of both power-seeking of ethnic/religious groups
together with bad policies would lead the situation to a violent conflict. This view seems to be
growing among academicians and social scientists more than the other two views (Hasenclever
and Rittberge, 2000).
Based on these three main categories of theories about identity differences and
heterogeneity and its relationship to conflict, I propose the first hypothesis of the paper.
H1: Countries with higher degree of religious heterogeneity face higher chance of
conflict.
This statement is directly based on primodialistic view and can be contradicted by other two
perspectives. This hypothesis has not been tested extensively in the literature. Most of the
research on conflict consider some sort of ethnic fractionalization in their analysis and not
specifically religious diversity (Gurr, 2000; Horwitz, 2000; Nordas, 2004). Besides some
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technical and empirical set-up, one important issue that changes the result of testing this
hypothesis in the literature is how to define the heterogeneity. As Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2004) show, using index of fractionalization or index for polarization makes a big difference in
the result. Fractionalization index is directly a function of how many different groups exist in a
society, as opposed to the polarization index that refers to how many large groups of minority are
in a country. In other word, polarization in a society is very high when there are few (in extreme
case, two) groups of different religious identities with political/social power. Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol (2004) develop this comparison for ethnicity variable and not religion.
4.2.2 Minorities’ Frustration
The idea that ethnic/religious groups‘ frustration transits into violent action, was originated by
Aristotle (Ellina and Moore, 1990). Simply he argues that groups with limited share of power,
start developing frustration through time and this, given sufficient opportunity and resources,
would accumulate in a confrontation with the power. So with this view existence of a political
power, state, is taken for granted and the state confronts the ideology (here religion) of the
minority groups. Dollard et al. (1939) is the premier advocate of this view and followed by them
there have been researchers who focus on this aspect of social violence (Davies, 1962; Gurr,
1970; Feierabend, 1966).
There is a plethora of examples in the literature of conflict that show how this frustration
which has roots in discrimination or in general contradicting identity with the power, leads to
political actions (Gurr, 2000) .Wentz (1987) argues when a group‘s religious view is threatened, the
natural reaction would be defensive action which sometimes occurs without considering the cost of
it. Geertz (1966) similarly argues that religious belief systems to some extent define individual‘s
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identity, and will provoke a reaction when it is under threats . Religious discrimination, similar to
other types of discrimination, leads to frustration and grievances, which can initiate a violent conflict.

The main hypothesis of the paper is based on this section of theory. As it is obvious, the
idea of discrimination and the frustration that comes with it can be studies and analyzed when we
include a major and important player, government. Governments‘ view on religion can be set on
spectrum. On one extreme, fully secular state which embraces all religious views and tolerates
practices, and on the other far end we would have governments with official religion and
distinctive religious view and zero tolerance for alternative ideology/faith and practices. Having
this in the perspective, I propose the following hypothesis:
H2: In countries with religious state in power, higher religious heterogeneity is
associated with higher risk of conflict.
So H2 is essentially an amendment to H1, by adding governments‘ religious view. In a
society which one (or some) religion is declared as the religion of the country and there is
limitation for practicing other faiths, minorities start to accumulate frustration due to deprivation
they are facing. Ultimately when there are more frustrated religious groups, this possibly would
turn to a violent conflict. The difference between this hypothesis and the previous one is that in
the first statement, there is no notion of isolation and deprivation of religious groups, therefore
no frustration-based mechanism would act to facilitate the confrontation. But in H2 the
difference in identities is not the forcing factor, rather it is the dictation of state over religious
groups that acts as a catalyst for conflict in diverse societies.
One important issue about this hypothesis is that how we define the religiosity of state.
Friedland (2001) claims that constitutional notion of religion is relatively a good measure on how
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religious a government is. This claim however can be criticized from some different aspects. I
will explain it in the methodology part. But in short probably it is safe to say one parsimonious
indicator of religiosity of a state is if the state has an official religion or not.
4.3
Variables and Data
In this section I explain all the variables involved in this project and the data used for them.
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics and the sources. I use the pooled sample of 128 countries
for the time range between 1990 to 2004.
4.3.1 Dependent Variable: Conflict
There is a large literature of quantitative studies with a focus on conflict in the country level. In
these studies it is crucial to define conflict clearly, since a small change in the dependent
variable‘s definition, changes the whole argument. Some studies focus on the onset of conflict
episodes, such as Collier and Hoeffler (2002) or Fearon and Laitin (2003). Some others study the
incidence of conflict (for example as a dummy that represents if any violent act has happened in
a certain year or not). Russett and Oneal (2003) based their argument on this aspect. Finally there
are studies that are concerned about duration of conflict (e.g. Doyle and Sambanis, 2000).
In this paper however I rely on the magnitude of conflict. The dependent variable is
designed to represent the magnitude of societal conflicts. Center for Systematic Peace (CSP) has
conducted a project, Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV), which has a comprehensive
list of all major conflicts from 1946 to 2006. Among all the variables, I use four and construct
the dependent variable from them; magnitude of civil violence, civil war, ethnic violence, and
ethnic war. The magnitude of these incidences is calculated in the scale of 0 to 10 based on the
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level of destruction, number of people dead or injured and population displaced.16 The dependent
variable, conflict, is the total civil and ethnic violence and warfare. It can be simply constructed
by summing the four variables (However, it is provided by the MPEV and I used the included
variable instead of summing). Therefore it has the value between 0 to 40, as it gets larger it refers
to a more destructive and violent incidence.
4.3.2 Religious Heterogeneity
Heterogeneity, as mentioned in the theory part, can be calculated differently. In general in the
literature, there are three main dimensions by which heterogeneity of a society can be
represented, namely fractionalization, polarization and dominance. In this paper, I only consider
fractionalization and polarization17.
The first one, as extendedly used in different literature, is defined as the probability that
two individuals randomly selected from a society, would belong to different (religious) groups.
Following gini-simpson index, it is calculated as follows. I call this measure diversity (for the
purpose of this paper, religious diversity).
∑
Where,

refers to the share of group i from the total population. The value of this index falls

between 0 and 1. As it gets larger, it means the society is more diverse.
Polarization however, is different from fractionalization by weighting heterogeneity
higher when there are few large groups, and not several small ones.

16

A complete explanation of dependent variable and how it is constructed can be found in the Appendix
section.
17
Dominance can be measured as the percentage of the population belonging to the largest group.
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∑(

Where

)

is the share of group i. So for example if there are two main religious groups in a

country where each of them has half of the population as members, then that society is extremely
polarized but is it would have diversity equal to 0.5. Therefore fractionalization (as I refer to by
diversity) and polarizations refer to somewhat similar issue but they have fundamental
difference. One example to show the difference between these two measures would be the cases
of United States and Lebanon. The U.S. has a high rate of diversity as it has several somewhat
similar size religious groups, but a low rate of polarization. In Lebanon in contrast, there are two
major religious group of almost the same size. In this case the society is religiously polarized in
two groups.
Besides the measure issue, we should be clear what do we mean by religious group. One
might separate religious groups by looking only at the major world religions. Alternatively,
we can consider specific religious groups within these world religions. This last way of
investigating religious diversity implies, for example, separating between Catholics and
Protestant Christians, and between Sunni and Shi‘a Muslims.

Both of these two

categorizations can be valid and important, based on the case of study. There are examples of
conflict occurring between religious sub-groups, such as in Northern Ireland, and tension
between the Sunni and the Shi‘a population in several countries, e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan and
what we are observing in Syria now. However, Huntington (1993) argues that the conflict
lines after the Cold War would be between different civilizations defined primarily in terms of
world religions. The cultural content is also often more similar within world religions than
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between them. There are also several examples of conflicts occurring between groups
belonging to different world religions, such as the conflicts in Kashmir, Sudan and IsraelPalestine. Although Huntignton‘s idea can be criticized in the real world by the numerous
conflicts which have been happening in the past decade, I use the world religion data instead of
sub-groups.
Data from World Religion Dataset (WRD) provided by Association of Religion Data
Archives (ARDA) is employed. The main part used for the purpose of calculation the
heterogeneity factors, are the percentages of population belonged to different religious groups.
Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism are the main world religion considered. Besides these, all
other groups are included in one ―Other‖ group. Also there is a non-religious group as well. The
adherence rates of these groups in countries for the period of time considered in this paper, do
not present significant variations.
4.3.3 State Religiosity
There have been some scattered studies on the notion of religion in the political structure
(Friedland, 2001). But it can be claimed that the most robust and complete quantitative study on
the topic has been done by Jonathan Fox (Fox, 2000; Fox, 2003; Fox, 2004). These papers are all
built upon the extensive research, The Religion and State (RAS) project, which examines
constitutional and state arrangements toward religion. This project includes a long list of
variables for 169 states between year 1990 and 2008.
In the previous section it was briefly mentioned that role of state in the religious market
and also its religious identity, is very significant when we are including such important sector,
government, to the analysis. In this paper for constructing one variable that captures different
aspects of state in the religion issues, I consider three components. All of them in one way or the
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other influence the frustration channel that was presented in the theoretical part. These
components are basically three areas in RAS that I believe can help us to understand ―how
religious‖ a country‘s government is. Existence of a (or some) official religion, declaration of the
fact that the state is a religious state, and finally the level of religious freedom in the country, are
the three variables by which state religiosity is assessed. All the factors are taken from Religion
and State (RAS) project database. Like religious heterogeneity, these variables are quite static
and do not present significant variations through time. Here I explain each of them.
Official religion (OFF)
In the RAS database there are multiple variables regarding the status of official religion in the
constitution. For example if there are more than one religion recognized as the official, if there is
any bias toward either one, if there is a clause indicating any officiality for notion of religion, etc.
Here I simply rely on the variable that shows whether there is at least one religion declared to be
the official religion. This dummy variable takes value of one in the case of existence of at least
one official religion in the state, and it gets zero otherwise. The primary empirical procedure to
test the main hypothesis relies on this variable. It means that the basic measure of state religiosity
is this variable.
Religious State (RS)
This variable is another dummy that shows if the state is declared as a religious state. The key
criterion for this measure is the notion in the constitution of a section that declares for example
state X is an Islamic country. Like the previous factor it has binary value of 1 or 0. In case of
religious state it would have value of one and zero in case of secular state.
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Religious Freedom (FREE)
Besides the overall constitutional representation of state‘s position with regard to religion, the
actual regulations and treatment toward religious groups are important factors that determine
states‘ religiosity. For this purpose, I consider five variables from RAS. They are all dummy
variables on the restrictions that constitution and governments‘ actions set on different religious
sectors.
0 = the restriction does not exist
1 = the restriction exists
1) Restrictions on conversions away from the dominant religion
2) Restrictions on personal status regarding marriage, divorce, burial, and inheritance
3) Restrictions on building, repairing and/or maintaining places of worship, including
restrictions on holding religious meetings in private homes.
4) Restrictions on proselytizing
5) Mandatory religious education
The overall freedom variable is the sum of these five dummies. This will result in a variable for
religious freedom that gets values between 0 (least restriction, most free) to 5(most restriction,
least free).
Now, first only the official religion variable (OFF) will be considered in the regression
analysis and then as a robustness check, I look into a more comprehensive state religiosity
variable. That will be the sum of three variables presented: OFF, RS and FREE.

Then

I

add

these three criteria together to have a proxy for state religiosity, a variable which takes value
between 0 to 7. As the value increase, the state is more religious and restrictive.
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4.3.4 Control Variables
Without considering different characteristics of countries, we cannot deliver a sound argument
for testing the hypotheses. Therefore a set of covariates are included in the regressions. Based on
major research works in the literature of conflict, all these variables seems to have important
impact on conflict incidences (Ellingsen, 2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Fearon and Laitin,
2003).
Economic Characteristics


GDP per Capita and GDP per Capita Growth

There is a robust consensus in the literature that suggests significant relationship between
economic performance and risk of conflict. Researchers analyze this relationship from
different aspects. For example Hergre et al. (2001) argues that overall better economic
condition makes the establishment of institutions for peace between groups more feasible. De
Soysa (2002) claims that when economy is doing better government can collect higher
revenue and therefore provide better peaceful environment. Based on the same lines of
argument, Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoffler (2002) suggest a negative
association between economic development and conflict.
Very similar to the reasoning for inclusion of GDP per capita, growth of this variable can
be included in the model with expectation of having a negative correlation to the dependent
variable. Gurr (1970) argues that regardless of initial level of wealth, lower level of growth
can increase the deprivation of minority groups and ultimately lead to higher chance of
conflict.
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I use GDP per capita in constant 2000 US dollars. The data is from World Development
Indicator (WDI) of World Bank. The variable is log transformed and lagged by one year.
Lagged growth rate of GDP per capita from WDI is included in the models as well.


Gini Index

One key issue in the rising of conflict among groups is the difference in their socio-economic
status. As the differences rise, the possibility of confrontation of the groups increases. Hergre
et al. (2001) refers to this expectation under the theory of deprivation, which claims
minorities accumulate frustration increasingly due to expansion of segregation between
classes.
In the context of economic status, gini index, which captures the inequality of income
distribution, can represent the gaps between groups. Datafor this index gathered from The
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (2008) by Frederik Solt.
Political and Institutional Characteristics


Institutional Quality

In the literature of development economics, it has been repeatedly shown that institutions
have significant role in different socioeconomic aspects of any society. One can think of a
nation with low quality institutions, particularly an inefficient legal system where property
rights are not well protected, and rationalize a high possibility of conflict among groups.
When judicial system does not work properly and the specific role of government to enforce
the law is not delivered, it is likely that groups with conflicting goals start violent actions.
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For this reason an indicator of institutional quality, Economic Freedom of the World
Index, by Gwartney, Hall and Lawson (2011), is considered as another control variable. Note
that this index consists of 5 main areas on size of government, legal structure, access to
sound money, freedom to trade, and regulations in labor market and businesses. Here I only
include the second component on legal structure and security of property rights.18


Regime Type

The political model of a country can play an important role in preventing a society from conflict
(Eckstein and Gurr, 1975). We can consider democratic versus autocratic systems as two
extremes and multiple midpoint regimes as the usual alternatives in the real world. The common
sense might dictates that democracies would be less prone to conflict and violence. Basically
there are various channels through which democracy can be related to lower level of conflict. As
Ellingsen (2000) and Rummel (1995) argue, democracy provides the institutions for peaceful
relation among groups within a society. But on the other hand there is a valid argument which
states, since democracy gives the relative freedom to minorities to promote their ideas and
values, naturally confrontation of identities will be more pronounced and that may cause violent
conflicts (Auvinen, 1997). Overall regime type is an essential variable to be included in order to
explain the conflict. Like multiple studies in the realm of political analysis of conflict, I use
PolityIV index. This index consists of three main components (political market competitiveness,
openness of excusive, and the restriction on the chief executive) and it gets value between
-10(least democratic) to 10(most democratic). PolityIV is the product of a project called with
same name conducted by Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr. I used the data from the report in 2011.

18

Table including Economic Freedom components is presented in the Appendix.
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Other Characteristics


Population

Size of population can impact the propensity to violent action based on several hypotheses. A
large population size by nature means more diverse set of ideas; it can be belief or faith issue
or only personal values. Also countries with larger population usually are more expanded
geographically. This makes the control of possible confrontations difficult. Fearon and Laitin
(2003) argue that higher population means more layers of social and political classes, and
this can increase the propensity to collide as well. For all these reasons, log transform of
population of countries is included in the model and it is expected to positively impact the
dependent variable.
 New State

States that just newly got their independence usually need some time to structure the
institutions and be completely consolidated. Some studies, such as Hegre et al. (2001) or
Fearon and Laitin (2001, 2003) show that these states are more prone to conflict. The
underlying reasoning for this is the potential of empowering the rebel groups in an unstable
environment. Some of these rebel groups can be the groups rooted in the previous regime in
power. In any case, the duration of settlement of a stable system in a country seems to be a
relevant variable to include in analysis of conflict (Nordas, 2004). Hence, I have included a
dummy variable for the first two years of independence. The dummy gets value equal to
one if the state has gotten its independence in the past two years and it gets zero otherwise.
For this variable, I use the dataset employed in Nordas (2004).
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Oil Exporter

Some studies in the literature (e.g. Fearon and Laitin, 2003 and Nordas, 2004) find that oil
exporting countries face higher risk of conflict. The theoretical justification for such behavior
is the idea of resource curse and political Dutch disease. As a controlling power has the
ultimate ownership of resources, such as oil, motivation of left-out groups to become part of
rebel organizations will increase. The variable in the regressions here is from Fearon and
Laitin (2003). It is a dummy which gets value equal one when more than one third of state
revenue is from oil and otherwise it is equal zero.
4.4
Methodology
The basis of empirical method is regression analysis. To present testing the two hypotheses of
the paper, I looked at ten different specifications. The general form of model would be as
follows:

Where, RH is measure of religious heterogeneity, SR is represents state religiosity and X is a
matrix of control variables.
An important note that should be pointed out here is about the statistical model I picked
to use. As discussed in the variable and data section, the dependent variable, magnitude of
conflict, can only take values of between 0 to 40. Also there are around 40 percent of the
countries that in different years have the conflict variable equal to zero19. These limitations make
the possibility of bias and inconsistency of ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficients estimate
increase. That is why instead of OLS, I rely on Tobit model and estimates of Maximum

19

For 47 countries the conflict variable is almost constantly equal to zero.
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Likelihood. Nordas (2004) which uses the same dependent variable implements Tobit model.
The Tobit model is a double-sided model with upper limit of 40 and lower limit of 0.
4.5

Empirical Results and Analysis

H1: Hypothesis 1
In table 4.2, the results for testing the first hypothesis are presented. Model (1) and (3) are simple
bivariate relationships between two measures of religious heterogeneity, religious diversity and
polarization, and magnitude of conflict in countries. In the bivariate relationships, it seems that
only polarization shows significant positive impact on conflict while religious diversity does not
have any statistically significant relationship. That can be translated as, if there are few large
religious groups; conflict would happen with larger magnitude compared to the situation when
there are large numbers of small and diverse religious groups. However, when I include the set of
control variables (Model 2 and 4), both of these measures of heterogeneity loose the significance.
Therefore for the first hypothesis, when we are just simply looking at the bivariate
relationships, it seems that countries with polarized religious society tend to have more frequent
conflict. But it is not necessarily the case for fractionalized countries. This result is along with
the literature‘s finding (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Nordas, 2004). But it cannot be reliable, since
the specification is missing all the important control variables.
When we consider model (2) and (4), there is not enough evidence to support the
hypothesis, neither for fractionalized nations nor for polarized. So in summary, for this sample
under study, hypothesis one can statistically be rejected, confirming the disconnection between
religious heterogeneity and conflict.
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H2: Hypothesis 2
For testing the second hypothesis, first we need to include the state religiosity variable. At this
level the simple dummy variable regarding the existence of official religion in the constitution
(OFF) is considered for state religiosity. Table 4.3 presents the results regarding the second
hypothesis. The first column, model 5, shows the bivariate regression results for state religiosity.
The coefficient is statistically insignificant. So based on this simple regression we cannot
comment on the relationship that state religiosity might have with the magnitude of conflict.
Even after including control variables, in model 6, we still do not observe any significance for
the coefficient. But the negative sign is interesting to pay attention to. It simply claims that
having official religion is associated with less conflict. This relationship is not particularly in the
interest of testing hypothesis 2. Therefore for testing the second hypothesis, four specifications,
models 7 to 10, are presented.
More specifically model 8 and 10 are the ones used to test the hypothesis. In both of these
specifications, an interaction variable is included. Model 8 is for polarization and model 10 for
religious diversity. Coefficient of the interaction term in model 8 is 2.94. This means that if we
have two countries one with official religion and one secular, a unit increase in the polarization
measure for the two countries make the conflict to have almost 3 units of magnitude higher in the
religious state than the secular country. So basically it seems that official religion in countries
act as a catalyst that makes impact of polarization on conflict magnified.
Exactly the same interaction variable is used for religious diversity in model 10. However
the coefficient here is not statistically significant. From this we can claim that state religious
status does not impact the relationship between religious diversity and conflict.

90

Model 7 and 9 are similar to model six with addition of religious heterogeneity measures.
One important issue in these two models is the insignificance of both religious heterogeneity
variables. Also it seems that official religion in the constitution negatively impacts the conflict
magnitude. As discussed in the previous section, the theoretical explanation for this relationship
can be due to lower political and social power of religious minority groups. In the case of
existence of a religious state, minorities may have less access to resources and opportunities to
mobilize the adherents.
Control variables show different behaviors, some confirming the expectation and some
falsifying them. For example among three economic characteristics included, gini shows
significant relationship, but opposite of expectation. Negative sign of the coefficient, states that
as the income inequality increases, magnitude of conflict decreases. But the negative sign of
GDP per capita coefficient shows that as income of individuals increase, we would see less
conflict. This is along the expectation. Institutional quality by Economic Freedom Index,
presents the expected behavior. The better institutions are, the less conflict we would see.
However the regime type in general does not present significant relationship. Population is
positively related to conflict. The duration of independence of countries negatively impacts the
conflict magnitude.
For robustness check, I run the same sets of specifications, model 5 through 10, for a
more comprehensive variable of state religiosity. As explained in the previous sections, the three
measures of state religiosity: official religion, declaration of religious state, and religious
freedom are combined by summing them up (STATREL). This variable gets values between 0
and 7, and as it increases it refers to higher state religiosity. Since the additional two
components, declaration of religiosity and religious freedom are included, it should be noted that
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this variable is essentially measuring a different concept. In the real world, there are countries,
which have secular state but religious freedom are not in the ―best‖ level. Or there are also
countries which have official religion, but the regulations embrace other faiths and provide
freedom for their adherents. So STATEREL simply gives a broad picture of importance of
religion in the government.
After running the models with the new variable, essentially the same results with minor
variations in magnitude and significance can be observed. Results of different specification with
this variable are presented in table 4.4.
One point worth mentioning is the change in the log-liklihood magnitude among different
specifications.
4.6
Conclusion
This paper examines role of state religiosity in conflict. Previous literature lacks this aspect when
analyzing heterogeneity of societies. The main research question here is, whether level of state‘s
religiosity has any impact on relationship between religious heterogeneity and conflict. Basically
I want to investigate whether religious heterogeneity in countries with different state religiosity
impacts conflict differently.
After controlling for a set of covariates, Tobit regression results indicate that in countries
with religious state, higher religious heterogeneity is associated with larger magnitude of
conflict. It means that having a religious state facilitates the initiation of instability and increases
the magnitude of conflict as society gets more diverse or polarized.
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Appendix C
Conflict Variable (CONF)
The nature and intensity of conflict episodes are completely different across countries or even within one
country in different times. For a comprehensive study like Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) a
detailed categorizations is needed. As some episodes are quite complex and, in some cases, detailed
information on the episode is quite limited; therefore, some cases are difficult to assign to a single
category. Particularly problematic are the designations of societal (intrastate) conflicts as either ―civil‖ or
―ethnic‖ as there is often a mixture of political and social identity attributes, especially in regard to
episodes of greater magnitude and longer duration. In addition, some may see the distinction made in the
compilation of episodes between violence and war as somewhat arbitrary. In making this distinction,
information regarding the degree of militant organization, tactical and strategic characteristics, and
expressed level of commitment to the use of violence are taken into consideration.
In the description of dataset, it is noted by the authors: ―Those who are concerned about the validity of
these distinctions should use the aggregated categories‖. This is particularly the variable I use in the
paper.
The main societal effects considered in MEPV for magnitude assessment of warfare and violence are as
follow:
- Human Resources: direct and indirect deaths, direct and indirect injuries, sexual crimes and
intimidations
- Population Dislocations: costs, traumas, inefficiencies and indirect impact associated with
displacements (personal-safety, logistics, etc.)
- Societal Network: damage and distortions to the fragile fabric of inter-personal associations and the
disintegration of relationships and identities based on amity, trust, exchange, mutual-benefit, comity,
reciprocity, and deferred gratification, relations necessary for the proper and effective functioning of
normative systems (social cooperation, cohesion, coherence, and coordination in politico-legal,
economic, professional, and socio-cultural sub-systems).
- Environmental Quality: direct and indirect damage and destruction to general ecosystem; use or
release of explosive, corrosive, and devegative chemical compounds and mechanical devices that
limit utilization of agricultural resources, foul surface and subterranean water resources, pollute
atmosphere, disseminate toxic substances, and destroy wildlife and habitats.
- Infrastructure Damage: direct and indirect damage, destruction, and over-consumption of material
and mechanical infrastructure, resources, and surpluses such as production facilities, storage,
transport networks, vehicles, water supplies, croplands, food, medical supplies, etc.
Based on these areas of impacts, warfare magnitudes are categorized in 10 categories as follow (from the
smallest magnitude to the highest):
- Sporadic or Expressive Political Violence (01)
- Limited Political Violence(02)
- Serious Political Violence(03)
- Serious Warfare(04)
- Substantial and Prolonged Warfare(05)
- Extensive Warfare(06)
- Pervasive Warfare(07)
- Technological Warfare(08)
- Total Warfare(09)
- Extermination and Annihilation(10)
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13Table A4.1:The Areas and Components of the EFW Index
Area 1: Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises
A :General government consumption spending
B :Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP
C :Government enterprises and investment
D :Top marginal tax rate: i: Top marginal income tax rate, ii: Top marginal income and payroll tax rate
Area 2: Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights
A Judicial independence (GCR)
B :Impartial courts (GCR)
C :Protection of property rights (GCR)
D :Military interference in rule of law and the political process (CRG)
E :Integrity of the legal system (CRG)
F :Legal enforcement of contracts (DB)
G :Regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property (DB)
Area 3: Access to Sound Money
A:Money Growth
B:Standard deviation of inflation
C:Inflation: Most recent year
D:Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts
Area 4: Freedom to Trade Internationally
Area 5: Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business
A:Taxes on international trade
A: Credit market regulations
i.International trade tax revenues (% of trade sector) i.Ownership of banks
ii.Mean tariff rate
ii.Foreign bank competition
iii.Standard deviation of tariff rates
iii.Private sector credit
B:Regulatory Trade Barriers
iv.Interest rate controls/Negative real interest rates
i Non-tariff trade barriers (GCR)
B: Labor market regulations
ii Compliance cost of importing and exporting (DB) i.Minimum wage (DB)
C:Size of the trade sector relative to expected
ii.Hiring and firing regulations (GCR)
D:Black-market exchange rates
iii.Centralized collective bargaining (GCR)
E:International capital market controls
iv.Mandated cost of hiring (DB)
i. Foreign ownership/investment restrictions (GCR) v .Mandated cost of worker dismissal (DB)
ii. Capital controls
vi.Conscription
C: Business Regulations
i.Price controls
ii.Administrative requirements (GCR)
iii.Bureaucracy costs (GCR)
iv .Starting a business (DB)
v.Extra payments/Bribes (GCR)
vi.Licensing restrictions (DB)
vii.Cost of tax compliance (DB)
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14Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics and Sources
Variable

Description

Std.
Dev.

0.21
0.18
0.03

Max

Source*

1.47 0
0.38 0
0.187 0

7
1
1

Constructed
RAS
RAS

1.32

1.59

0

5

RAS

Religious Fractionalization Index
Religious Polarization Index

0.30
0.57

0.22
0.24

0.004
0.001

0.98
0.99

Constructed, ARDA
Constructed, ARDA

Magnitude of Conflict
Magnitude of civil violence involving state
Magnitude of civil warfare involving state
Magnitude of ethnic violence involving state
Magnitude of ethnic warfare involving state

0.72
0.05
0.25
0.102
0.304

1.68
0.39
1.06
0.45
1.12

0
0
0
0
0

17
4
7
5
10

Constructed, MEPV
MEPV
MEPV
MEPV
MEPV

Log of GDP per capita (constant 2000, US$)
Gini index
Growth of GDP per capita
Economic Freedom of the World Index
PolityIV
Log of Population

7.77
38.31
2.006
5.51
2.89
15.48

1.64
9.68
6.35
1.82
6.70
2.11

4.05
16.87
-50.29
1.15
-10
9.2

11.59
69.78
101.1
9.62
10
21.01

World Bank-WDI
WDI, SWIID
World Bank-WDI
Fraser Institute
Polity IV Project
World Bank-WDI

=1 if the country became independent in the
past 2 years, =0 otherwise

0.02

0.15

0

1

Fearon&Laitin (2003)

Religion
STATEREL, State religiosity
Religiosity of State= OFF+ RS+FREE
Official Religion(OFF) =1 state has an official religion, =0 otherwise
Religious State(RS) =1 if state declared as religious state, =0
otherwise
Religious Freedom(FREE) Between 0 to 5. The higher means less freedom
RELDIV
POLAR

Mean

Min

Conflict
CONF
civviol
civwar
ethviol
ethwar
Other Variables
GDP
GINI
GROWTH
EFW2
REGIME
POP
NEWSTATE

OIL
=1 if the country is Oil Exporter, =0 otherwise 0.15
0.34 0
1
Fearon&Laitin (2003)
*RAS: Religion and State Project; Association of Religion Data Archive; MEPV: Major episodes of political violence; WDI: World BankDevelopment Indicators; SWIID: The Standardized World Income Inequality Database
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15Table 4.2 :Tobit Regression Results; Dependent Variable: Magnitude of Conflict ; pooled observations 1990-2004
(1)
0.890
(2.25)*

(2)
-0.188
(-1.37)

(3)
1.903
(4.52)**

(4)
-2.188
(-0.41)

Religious Diversity Index (RELDIV)

-0.327
(-0.90)

0.079
(0.67)

-------

-------

Polarization Index (POLAR)

-------

-------

0.398
(2.97)*

0.258
(1.08)

Log of GDP per Capita (GDP)

-------

-0.004
(-2.04)*

-------

-0.005
(-2.54)*

Gini Index (GINI)

-------

-0.022
(-2.01)*

-------

-0.148
(-3.18)*

GDP per Capita Growth (GROWTH)

-------

0.030
(1.34)

-------

1.841
(0.25)

Economic Freedom of the World Index-Area 2
(EFW2)

-------

-0.517

-------

-1.695

Consant

(-6.33)**

(-5.22)

Regime type-PolityIV (REGIME)

-------

0.030
(1.55)

-------

0.094
(1.78)

Log of Population (POP)

-------

0.329
(5.45)**

-------

0.412
(4.21)**

New State (NEWSTATE)

-------

-2.584
(-3.21)**

-------

-3.045
(-2.89)**

Oil Exporter ( OIL)

-------

0.395
(0.95)

-------

0.386
(0.78)

1920
-910.229

890
-490.329

1920
-907.658

890
-490.517

0.049

0.324

0.051

0.648

Observations
Log Likelihood
Pseudo R-squared
**Significant at 1% level, * Significant at 5% level

96

16Table 4.3: Tobit Regression Results; Dependent Variable: Conflict 1990-2004
(5)
1.721
(1.91)

(6)
1.212
(0.92)

(7)
1.123
(0.73)

(8)
1.018
(0.81)

(9)
1.115
(0.09)

(10)
1.021
(0.15)

Official Religion (OFF)

-0.421
(-0.95)

-0.312
(-1.53)

-0.225
(-1.91)*

-0.751
(-1.77)

-0.847
(-1.69)

-0.712
(-1.81)

Polarization Index (POLAR)

-------

-------

-------

-------

-------

0.258
(1.14)
2.942
(2.87)*

-------

OFF*POLAR

0.082
(1.02)
-------

-------

-------

Religious Diversity Index (RELDIV)

-------

-------

-------

-------

0.484
(1.11)

0.474
(1.24)

OFF*RELDIV

-------

-------

-------

-------

-------

Log of GDP per Capita (GDP)

-------

-0.001
(-1.21)

-0.032
(-1.82)

-0.091
(-2.07)*

-0.102
(-1.81)

1.874
(1.46)
-0.111
(-2.14)*

Gini Index (GINI)

-------

GDP per Capita Growth (GROWTH)

-------

-0.017
(-2.43)*
0.007
(0.53)

-0.019
(-2.54)*
0.023
(0.61)

-0.021
(-2.47)*
0.025
(1.07)

-1.027
(-1.98)
0.025
(1.08)

-1.031
(-2.99)**
0.028
(1.08)

Economic Freedom of the World Index-Area 2 (EFW2)

-------

-0.220
(-4.97)**

-0.285
(-4.47)**

-0.388
(-4.48)**

-0.545
(-3.99)**

-0.539
(-3.09)**

Regime type-PolityIV (REGIME)

-------

-0.028
(-1.97)*

-0.026
(-1.61)

-0.020
(-1.57)

-0.030
(-1.61)

-0.032
(-1.59)

Log of Population (POP)

-------

New State (NEWSTATE)

-------

Oil Exporter ( OIL)

-------

0.219
(4.81)**
-0.164
(-2.07)*
0.071
(0.52)

0.294
(4.91)**
-1.012
(-2.07)*
0.187
(0.81)

0.294
(5.01)**
-1.181
(-2.07)*
0.181
(1.05)

0.280
(4.91)**
-1.097
(-2.08)*
0.209
(1.04)*

0.277
(4.89)**
-1.095
(-2.07)*
0.0211
(1.05)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Pseudo R-squared

1920
-852.125
0.057

896
-502.154
0.457

896
-498.542
0.492

896
-243.582
0.664

896
-448.714
0.581

896
-263.754
0.654

Constant

**Significant at 1% level, * Significant at 5% level
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17Table 4.4: Tobit Regression Results; Dependent Variable: Conflict 1990-2004
(5)
1.247
(4.51)**

(6)
-1.062
(-0.72)

(7)
-1.110
(-0.73)

(8)
1.022
(2.11)*

(9)
1.175
(1.64)

(10)
1.112
(2.18)*

State Religiosity (STATEREL)

0.184
(3.15)*

0.462
(1.95)

0.452
(2.81)*

-0.941
(-1.54)

-0.847
(-0.99)

-1.048
(-1.68)

Polarization Index (POLAR)

-------

-------

0.058
(0.12)

-0.328
(-1.15)

-------

-------

STATEREL*POLAR

-------

-------

-------

1.289
(2.21)*

-------

-------

Religious Diversity Index (RELDIV)

-------

-------

-------

-------

0.864
(1.24)

0.045
(1.05)

STATERE*RELDIV

-------

-------

-------

-------

-------

Log of GDP per Capita (GDP)

-------

-0.046
(-1.43)

-0.043
(-1.99)*

-0.149
(-2.04)*

-0.112
(-2.11)*

0.998
(2.84)*
-0.121
(-2.41)*

Gini Index (GINI)

-------

-0.025
(-2.19)*

-0.025
(-2.10)*

-0.023
(-1.97)*

-1.021
(-1.99)*

-1.034
(-2.71)**

GDP per Capita Growth (GROWTH)

-------

0.023
(0.99)

0.023
(0.96)

0.025
(1.05)

0.141
(0.07)

0.174
(0.09)

Economic Freedom of the World Index-Area 2 (EFW2)

-------

-0.396
(-4.85)**

-0.398
(-4.77)**

-0.396
(4.74)**

-1.455
(-2.09)**

-1.614
(-2.99)**

Regime type-PolityIV (REGIME)

-------

Log of Population (POP)

-------

0.006
(0.24)
0.329
(5.11)**

0.006
(0.26)
0.329
(5.10)**

0.010
(0.42)
0.333
(5.15)**

0.079
(1.51)
0.471
(3.89)**

0.147
(1.25)
0.557
(4.19)**

New State (NEWSTATE)

-------

Oil Exporter ( OIL)

-------

-0.841
(-2.99)*
0.147
(0.02)

-1.021
(-2.08)*
0.378
(0.15)

-1.181
(-2.47)*
0.481
(2.04)*

-0.171
(-2.88)*
0.215
(1.98)*

-0.097
(-2.07)*
0.011
(1.81)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Pseudo R-squared

1920
-875.214
0.067

896
-488.214
0.395

896
-467.485
0.521

896
-384.452
0.610

896
-467.387
0.522

896
-383.864
0.612

Constant

**Significant at 1% level, * Significant at 5% level

98

Bibliography
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2002). Reversal of fortune: Geography and
institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 117(4), 1231-1294.
Acs, Z. and Armington, C. (2005). Using Census BITS to Explore Entrepreneurship, Geography,
and Economic Growth. Research Report No. 248, Small Business Administration, Office
of Advocacy, Washington, DC.
Afonso, A.; Schuknecht, L. and Tanzi, V. (2005). ―Public Sector Efficiency: An International
Comparison,‖ Public Choice, 123 (3-4), 321-347.
Afonso, A.; Schuknecht, L. and Tanzi, V. (2006). ―Public Sector Efficiency: Evidence for New
EU Member States and Emerging Markets,‖ European Central Bank, Working Paper n.
581
Afonso, A. and St. Aubyn (2005). ―Non-parametric Approaches to Education and Health
Efficiency in OECD Countries,‖ Journal of Applied Economics, 8 (2), 227-246.
Afonso A. and Fernandes, S. (2006). ―Local Government Spending Efficiency: DEA Evidence
for the Lisbon Region‖, Regional Studies 40 (1), 39-53.
Afonso A., L. Schuknecht, and V. Tanzi. (2008). ―Income distribution determinants and public
spending efficiency‖. Working Paper 861. European Central Bank.
Afonso, A., & St Aubyn, M. (2006). Cross-country efficiency of secondary education provision:
A semi-parametric analysis with non-discretionary inputs. Economic modelling, 23(3),
476-491.
Aldrich, H. and Zimmer, C.(1986). Entrepreneurship through social networks. In D. Sexton & R.
Smilor (Eds.). The art and science of entrepreneurship. 3-23. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
Alesina, A., Baqir, R., & Easterly, W. (1999). Public goods and ethnic divisions. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 114, 1243–1284.
Alesina, A., & La Ferrara, E. (2000). Participation in heterogeneous communities. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 115, 847–904.
Anderson, A.R, S. Drakopoulou-Dod and M G Scott ( 2000). Religion as an environmental
influence on enterprise culture – the case of Britain in the 1980s. International Journal of
Entrepreneurial Behaviour & Research, 6(1), 5-20.
Anderson, G.M., Tollison, R.D.(1992). Morality and monopoly: the constitutional political
economy of religious rules. Cato Journal 13, 373–391.
Anderson, G.M.(1988).Mr. Smith and the preachers: the economics of religion in the wealth of
nations. Journal of Political Economy, 1066–1088.
Anselin, L.(1988). Spatial Econometrics: Methods and Models. Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Dordrecht.
Audretsch David B. and Max C. Keilbach.(2005). Entrepreneurship Capital and Regional
Growth,‖ The Annals of Regional Science 39, 457-469.
Audretsch, David B.; Boente, Werner; Tamvada, Jagannadha Pawan (2007). Religion and
entrepreneurship, Jena economic research papers, No. 2007,075,
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25667
99

Audretsch, D. B., W. Bönte, and J. P. Tamvada. (2007). Religion and Entrepreneurship, CEPR.
Audretsch, D.B., Boente, W., Tamvada, J.P.(2007). Religion and entrepreneurship. CEPR
Discussion Paper n. DP6378.
Auvinen, J. (1997). Political conflict in less developed countries 1981-89. Journal of Peace
Research, 34(2), 177-195.
Barro, R.J. (1990). Government spending in a simple model of endogenous growth. Journal of
Political Economy, 98, S103-S125.
Barro, R.J., McCleary, R.M.(2003). Religion and economic growth across countries. American
Sociological Review 68, 760–781.
Berggren, N. (1997). Rhetoric or reality? An economic analysis of the effects of religion in
Sweden. Journal of Socio-Economics 26, 571–596.
Blanchard, O., & Perotti, R. (2002). An empirical characterization of the dynamic effects of
changes in government spending and taxes on output. the Quarterly Journal of
economics, 117(4), 1329-1368.
Blattman, C., & Miguel, E. (2010). Civil war. Journal of Economic Literature, 3-57.
Bloom, W. (1993). Personal identity, national identity and international relations (Vol. 9).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brockhaus, R. H. (1982).The psychology of the entrepreneur. In C. A. Kent, D. L. Sexton, & K.
H. Vesper (Eds.), Encyclopedia of entrepreneurship. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall, 39-57.
Carment, D. (1993). The international dimensions of ethnic conflict: Concepts, indicators, and
theory. Journal of Peace Research, 30(2), 137-150.
Carswell P., Rolland D. (2007). Religion and entrepreneurship in New Zealand. Journal of
Enterprising Communities: People and Places in the Global Economy, Vol. 1, No. 2,
162-174.
Casanova, J. (1994). Public religions in the modern world. University of Chicago Press.
Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., & Söderbom, M. (2004). On the duration of civil war. Journal of Peace
Research, 41(3), 253-273.
Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes . (1978 ). ―Measuring the efficiency of decision making
Units‖.European Journal of Operational Research, 2: 429 – 444
Clements, B. (2002). ―How Efficient is Education Spending in Europe?‖ European Review of
Economics and Finance, 1, 3-26.
Crain,W.M., Lee, K.J. (1999). Economic growth regressions for the American states: a
sensitivity analysis. Economic Inquiry 37, 242–257.
Davies, J. C. (1962). Toward a theory of revolution. American sociological review, 5-19.
De Borger, B., & Kerstens, K. (1996). Cost efficiency of Belgian local governments: A
comparative analysis of FDH, DEA, and econometric approaches. Regional Science and
Urban Economics, 26(2), 145-170.
100

De Mello, L., & Tiongson, E. R. (2006). Income inequality and redistributive government
spending. Public finance review, 34(3), 282-305.
De Soysa, I. (2002). Paradise is a bazaar? Greed, creed, and governance in civil war, 1989-99.
Journal of Peace Research, 39(4), 395-416.
Dodd, S.D. and G. Gotsis. (2007). The interrelationships between entrepreneurship and religion.
Dollard, J., Doob, L. W., Miller, N. E., Mowrer, O. H., Sears, R. R., Ford, C. S., ... &
Sollenberger, R. T. (1939). Frustration and aggression (pp. 438-439). New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press.
Doyle, M. W., & Sambanis, N. (2000). International peacebuilding: A theoretical and
quantitative analysis. The International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovations,
8(2): 93-104.
Dubini P, Aldrich H. (1991). Personal and extended networks are central to the entrepreneurial
process. Journal of Business Venturing 6(5): 305–313.
Easterly, W., & Levine, R. (1997). Africa‘s growth tragedy: Policies and ethnic divisions.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 1203–1250.
Eckstein, H., & Gurr, T. R. (1975). Patterns of authority: A structural basis for political inquiry.
New York: Wiley.
Eicher, T. S., & Leukert, A. (2009). Institutions and economic performance: Endogeneity and
parameter heterogeneity. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 41(1), 197-219.
Elhorst, J P. ,2010. "Applied Spatial Econometrics: Raising the Bar", Spatial Economic Analysis,
5:1,9-28
Ellina, M., & Moore, W. H. (1990). Discrimination and political violence: A cross-national study
with two time periods. The Western Political Quarterly, 267-278.
Ellingsen, T. (2000). Colorful community or ethnic witches' brew? Multiethnicity and domestic
conflict during and after the Cold War. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(2), 228-249.
Emrouznejad, A., & Thanassoulis, E. (2001). An extensive bibliography of data envelopment
analysis (DEA). Volume I–V Coventry: University of Warwick,[Online] Available from:<
http://www. warwick. ac. uk/~ bsrlu> Last accessed: February, 14, 2008.
Fakin, B., & De Crombrugghe, A. (1997). Fiscal Adjustments in transition economies transfers
and the efficiency of public spending: A comparison with OECD Countries. World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper.
Fan, C.S., 2008. Religious participation and children‘s education: a social capital approach.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 65, 303–317.
Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. American political
science review, 97(1), 75-90.
Feierabend, I. K., & Feierabend, R. L. (1966). Aggressive behaviors within polities, 1948-1962:
a cross-national study. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 249-271.
Fox, J.(1997). ‗The Salience of Religious Issues in Ethnic Conflicts: A Large-N Study‖
Nationalism

101

Fox, J.(1999). ‗The Influence of Religious Legitimacy on Grievance Formation by Ethno–
Religious Minorities‘, Journal of Peace Research 36(3): 289–307.
Fox, J.(2000). ‗Religious Causes of Discrimination against Ethno-Religious Minorities‘,
International Studies Quarterly 44(3): 423–450.
Fox, J.(2001). ‗Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations‘, International
Studies Review 3(3): 53–73.
Fox, J.(2003). ‗Religion and State Codebook‘, unpublished.
Fox, K. J. (1999). Efficiency at different levels of aggregation: public vs. private sector firms.
Economics Letters, 65(2), 173-176.
Galtung, J. (1964). A structural theory of aggression. Journal of Peace Research, 95-119.
Garcia-Montalvo, J., & Reynal-Querol, M. (2005). Ethnic polarization, potential conflict, and
civil wars. Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars (July 2004).
Geertz, C., & Banton, M. (1966). Religion as a cultural system.
Gill, A., & Keshavarzian, A. (1999). State building and religious resources: An institutional
theory of church-state relations in Iran and Mexico. Politics and Society, 27, 431-465.
Greeley, A., 1997. The other civic America, religion and social capital. American Prospect 32,
68–73.
Greve A, Salaff JW (2003). Social networks and entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship Theory and
Practice 28(1):1–22.
Gruber, J. (2005). Religious market structure, religious participation and outcomes: is religion
good for you. Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy 591, 1–30.
Gupta, S. (2011). Efficiency-adjusted public capital and growth. International Monetary Fund.
Gupta, S., & Verhoeven, M. (2001). The efficiency of government expenditure: experiences
from Africa. Journal of Policy Modeling, 23(4), 433-467.
Gurr, T. R. (1995). Minorities at risk- a global view of ethnopolitical conflicts. UNITED
STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE PRESS, ARLINGTON, VA 22210(USA). 1995.
Gurr, T. R. (2000). Peoples versus states: Minorities at risk in the new century. United States Inst
of Peace Press.
Gwartney, J. D., & Joshua, C. (2011). Hall, et Robert Lawson (2010). Economic Fredom of the
World: 2010 Annual Report.
Haan, J. and Siermann, C. (1998).‖ Further evidence on the relationship between economic
freedom and economic growth‖. Public Choice, v. 95, n. 3-4, p.363-80
Hagen, E. E. ,1960. The entrepreneur as rebel against traditional society. Human Business
Review, 72(4), 37-46
Hall, R. E., & Jones, C. I. (1999). Why do some countries produce so much more output per
worker than others?. The quarterly journal of economics, 114(1), 83-116.

102

Hasenclever, A., & Rittberger, V. (2000). Does religion make a difference? Theoretical
approaches to the impact of faith on political conflict. MILLENNIUM-LONDONLONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS-, 29(3), 641-674.
Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P., & Rittberger, V. (2000). Integrating theories of international
regimes. Review of International Studies, 26(1), 3-33.
Haynes, J. (1997). Religion, secularisation and politics: a postmodern conspectus. Third World
Quarterly, 18(4), 709-728.
Heath,W.C.,Waters, M.S.,Watson, J.K. (1995). Religion and economic welfare: an empirical
analysis of state per capita income. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 27,
129–142.
Hegre, H., Ellingsen, T., Gates, S., & Gleditsch, N. P. (2001). Toward a democratic civil peace?
Democracy, political change, and civil war, 1816-1992. American political science
review, 95(1), 33-48.
Henderson, Jason. (2006). ―Understanding Rural Entrepreneurship at the County Level: Data
Challenges,‖ Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Omaha.
Hirsch, B. T., & Macpherson, D. A. (2002). Union membership and coverage database from the
current population survey: Note. Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev., 56, 349.
Horowitz, D. L. (1985). Ethnic groups in conflict. Univ of California Press.
Hull, B.R., Bold, F., 1998. Product variety in religious markets. Review of Social Economy 56,
1–19.
Huntington, S. P. (1993). The clash of civilizations?. Foreign affairs, 22-49.
Iannaccone, L.R. (1998). Introduction to the economics of religion. Journal of Economic
Literature 36, 1465–1495.
Iannaccone, L.R. (1995). Religion, values, and behavioral constraint. Working Paper. Available
at: www.religionomics.com/archives/file_download/35/Iannaccone+-+Values.pdf
Keefer, P., & Knack, S. (2007). Boondoggles, rent-seeking, and political checks and balances:
public investment under unaccountable governments. The Review of Economics and
Statistics, 89(3), 566-572.
Khilstrom, R., & Laffont, J. (1979). A general equilibrium entre- preneurial theory of firm
formation based on risk aver- sion. Journal of Political Economy, 87: 719-748.
Kirzner, Israel M. (1979). Perception, Opportunity, and Profit: Studies in the Theory of
Entrepreneurship, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1995). Institutions and economic performance: cross‐country tests using
alternative institutional measures. Economics & Politics, 7(3), 207-227.
Knight, Frank H., 1921. Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin
Company.
Lemarchand, R. (1972). Political clientelism and ethnicity in tropical Africa: Competing
solidarities in nation-building. The American Political Science Review, 66(1), 68-90.
103

LeSage, James P. and Pace, R. Kelley. (2010). The Biggest Myth in Spatial Econometrics,
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1725503.
Lipford, J., McCormick, R.E., Tollison, R.D. (1993). Preaching matters. Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization 21, 235–250.
Lipford, J.W., Tollison, R.D. (2003). Religious participation and income. Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization 51, 249–260.
Low, Sarah, Jason Henderson, and Stephan Weiler. (2005). Gauging a Region‟s Entrepreneurial
Potential. Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 90(3), 61-89.
McClelland, D. C. (1965). Achievement and entrepreneurship: A longitudinal study. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 1, 389-392.
McGranahan, D.A. (1999). Natural amenities drive rural population change. Food and Rural
Economics Division. Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture
Agricultural Economics Report No. 781,Washington, DC.
Montalvo, José G. & Marta Reynal-Querol. (2005). ‗Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict,
and Civil Wars‘, American Economic Review 95(3): 796–816.
Newbury, M. C. (1983). Colonialism, ethnicity, and rural political protest: Rwanda and Zanzibar
in comparative perspective. Comparative Politics, 15(3), 253-280.
Nold Hughes, P. A., & Edwards, M. E. (2000). Leviathan vs. Lilliputian: a data envelopment
analysis of government efficiency. Journal of Regional Science, 40(4), 649-669.
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge
university press.
Okun, A. (1975). Equality and efficiency: The big tradeoff. Washington: The brookings
Institution.
Oneal, J. R., Russett, B., & Berbaum, M. L. (2003). Causes of peace: Democracy,
interdependence, and international organizations, 1885–1992. International Studies
Quarterly, 47(3), 371-393.
Peltzman, S. (1980). Growth of Government, The. JL & Econ., 23, 209.
Pfaff, W. (1993). Invitation to War. Foreign Affairs, 97-109.
Pritchett, L. (2000). Understanding patterns of economic growth: Searching for hills among
plateaus, mountains, and plains. The World Bank Economic Review, 14(2), 221-250.
Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. Simon
and Schuster, New York.
Putnam, R.D. (1993). Making DemocracyWork: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton
University Press, Princeton.
Rey, S.J., Montouri, B.D., 1999. US regional income convergence: a spatial econometric
perspective. Regional Studies 33, 143–156.
Roy Thurik, Sander Wennekers, (2004) "Entrepreneurship, small business and economic
growth", Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development, Vol. 11 Iss: 1, pp.140 149
104

Rummel, R. J. (1995). Democracy, power, genocide, and mass murder. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 39(1), 3-26.
Rupasingha, A., Goetz, S.J., Freshwater, D. (2002). Social and institutional factors as
determinants of economic growth: evidence from the United States Counties. Papers in
Regional Science 81, 139–155.
Sander,W. (2002). Religion and human capital. Economics Letters 75, 303–307.
Schultz, Theodore W. (1980). Investment in Entrepreneurial Ability,‖ Scandinavian Journal of
Economics 82, 437-448.
Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1934). The Theory of Economic Development, Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Scully, G.W. (2002). ―Economic Freedom, Government Policy and the Trade-Off between
Equity and Economic Growth‖, Public Choice, 113(1-2): 77-96.
Seul, J. R. (1999). Ours is the way of god': Religion, identity, and intergroup conflict. Journal of
Peace Research, 36(5), 553-569.
Smidt, C. (1999). Religion and civic engagement: a comparative analysis. Annals of American
Academy of Social and Political Science 565, 176–192.
Smith, A. D. (1996). Culture, community and territory: the politics of ethnicity and nationalism.
International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 445-458.
Sobel, R. S., & Hall, J. C. (2007). Effects of Judicial Selection Process on Judicial Quality: The
Role of Partisan Politics, The. Cato J., 27, 69.
Solt, F. (2008), ‗The Standardized World Income Inequality Database‘,
http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/11992 V4 [Version]
Steen, T.P. (1996). Religion and earnings: evidence from the NLS youth cohort. International
Journal of Social Economics 23, 47–58.
Steensland, B., Park, J.Z., Regnerus, M.D., Robinson, L.D., Wilcox,W.B.,Woodberry, R.D.
(2000). The measure of American religion: toward improving the state of the art. Social
Forces 79, 291–318.
Stryker, S., & Burke, P. J. (2000). The past, present, and future of an identity theory. Social
psychology quarterly, 284-297.
Tanzi, V., & Davoodi, H. (1998). Corruption, public investment, and growth (pp. 41-60).
Springer Japan.
Tilly, C. (1978). From mobilization to revolution (p. 143). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Tolbert, C.M., Lyson, T.A., Irwin, M.D. (1998). Local capitalism, civic engagement, and
socioeconomic well-being. Social Forces 77, 401–427.
Tolmie, C. (2007). Public spending, governance, and development: a review of the literature.
Results for Development Institute Working Paper. Washington, DC: Results for
Development Institute.
Tomes, N. (1984). The effects of religion and denomination on earnings and the returns to
human capital. Journal of Human Resources 19, 472–488.

105

Tong, C. (1996): Industrial Production Efficiency and its Spatial Disparity among the TVEs
of China: A DEA Analysis. Singapore Economic Review, Vol. 41, No. 1, 85-101.
Tullock, G. (1983). Further tests of a rational theory of the size of government. Public Choice,
41(3), 419-421.
Vanhanen, T. (2000). A new dataset for measuring democracy, 1810-1998. Journal of Peace
Research, 37(2), 251-265.
Weber, M. (2002). The Protestant Ethic and the ―Spirit‖ of Capitalism and OtherWritings.
Penguin Classics, London.
Welsh, D. (1996). Ethnicity in sub-saharan Africa. International Affairs (Royal Institute of
International Affairs 1944-), 477-491.
Wuthnow, R. (1997). The role of trust in civic renewal (Working Paper No. 1). National
Commission on Civic Renewal, University of Maryland.
Zeev Maoz and Errol A. Henderson. (2013). The World Religion Dataset, 1945-2010: Logic,
Estimates, and Trends. International Interactions, 39(3).

106

